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ABSTRACT
Real property has been called the corporation's last undermanaged
resource. However, during the past decade, companies have begun to
concentrate more on what constitutes 25 to 40% of a typical corporation's assets.
US corporate real estate assets amount to greater than $3 trillion and real estate
expenses are typically second or third highest on the corporate ledger, only
behind payroll and sometimes technology.
Corporate executives have begun to realize the business value real estate
can have. Facilities lacking the proper location, finance, design, or the proper
amount of flexibility required to manage internal and external uncertainties can
negatively impact the corporation's bottom line. Meanwhile, strategic planning
increases in importance in the international setting due to the risks and rewards
of executing business strategies increases at the international level.
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has opened
twenty-eight countries to free markets. Corporations are hungry to expand into
these markets which offer the opportunity of serving over 400 million customers.
Uncertainties are heightened in transitional economies, making international
corporate real estate management that much more challenging.
This thesis research was a qualitative exploration of the corporate real
estate challenges and practices in one particular transitional economy, Ukraine.
Corporate real estate in Ukraine was found to be transactional in nature, not
strategic. Almost all decisions are made locally. The challenges found in Ukraine
center around an immature administrative infrastructure along with corporate
efforts to control the costs associated with real estate. Although complex, the
challenges found in Ukraine do not preclude participation in the market; rather,
they merely impede the process.
Thesis Supervisor: Sandra Lambert
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of
people.
Special kudos go out to:
thesis advisor Sandra Lambert, for supporting my
desire, when no one else would, to combine
my real estate skills with my knowledge and
interest in Ukraine. Her patience,
professionalism, and optimism were all
admirable under extenuating circumstances,
Donna, my thesis "counselor" for providing me with
insight about the thesis process,
Georges, my computer "geek" brother for his technical
support,
Tatyana, for her continuous optimism,
encouragement, other special talents that
made this work possible,
my classmates for their openness, acceptance, and
camaraderie,
and my interviewees whose willingness to share their
time and experience with me was invaluable in the
final product.
Final thanks go out to my loving parents for their unconditional support.
3
Corporate Real Estate:
Challenges and Practices in Ukraine
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ 2
ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................. 4
LIST OF EXHIBITS ........................................ 6
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ........................................ 7
Corporate Real Estate- A Managerial Function in Transition
Globalization of Business - Corporate Real Estate Challenges
Purpose and Methodology of Thesis
CHAPTER 2 - INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ........................................................ 14
History
Reasons for Growth of International Business
Forms of International Business
Foreign Direct Investment Theory - Why Does it Occur?
Synopsis
CHAPTER 3 - TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES ................................................. 21
In a Competitive Global Economy
Foreign Direct Investment Trends in Transitional Economies
Investment Preferences
Country Popularity
Synopsis
4
CHAPTER 4 - UKRAINE ...................................... 32
History
Transition Since Independence
Investment in Ukraine
Climate
Privatization
Impediments to Investment in Ukraine
Motives for Investment in Ukraine
Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine
Ukrainian Real Estate
Office Market
Residential Market
Manufacturing Space Market
Warehouse Space Market
Retail Space Market
Hotel Market
Synopsis
Challenges Associated with Real Estate in Ukraine
Transport Infrastructure
Lack of Telecommunications Infrastructure
Obtaining Planning Permission Takes Too Long
Difficulties with Local Banks
Difficulty Obtaining Real Estate
CHAPTER 5 - DATA ANALYSIS - CORPORATE REAL ESTATE IN UKRAINE..44
Insights
Decision Making Process
Real Estate Service Provider Usage
Form of Entry into Ukraine and Real Estate Strategy
Service Sector
Manufacturing Sector
Space Procurement Decisions
Real Estate Challenges In Ukraine
Challenges
Synopsis
Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS ...................................... 64
ENDNOTES ........................................ 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 71
5
LIST OF EXHIBITS
1-1 Paradigm Shift in Corporate Real Estate Management ................................ 9
2-1 Forms of International Business ............................................................... 16
2-2 W orld FDI ........................................................ 18
2-3 Worldwide Cross-border M&A Sales (Majority Foreign-owned) ................... 19
3-1 Global Competitiveness Rankings and Transitional Economies
Rankings ........................................................ 23
3-2 Nations in Transit 1998 Ratings Summary ................................................... 24
3-3 FDI Inflows by Region and Country, 1993-1998 ........................................... 30
4-1 Change in Ukrainian GDP & Exchange Rate ............................................... 33
4-2 Impediments to Investing in the Following Transitional Economies .............. 36
4-3 Ukraine's Rankings in the Eight Variables of the Global Competitiveness
Report ........................................................ 37
4-4 Motives for Investing in Ukraine ......................................................... 39
4-5 FDI Comparison Between Select Central and Eastern European
Countries, 1998 ........................................................................ 40
4-6 Cost of Apartments in Kyiv in US Dollars, 2000 ........................................... 42
5-1 Decision Making Process ........................................................ 46
5-2 Form of Entry and Real Estate Strategy for Service Sector Companies ....... 48
5-3 Form of Entry and Real Estate Strategy for Manufacturing Companies ...... 50
5-4 Real Estate Challenges in Ukraine ......................................................... 53
6
Chapter 1
Introduction
Corporate Real Estate (CRE)- a management function in transition
Real property has been called the corporation's last undermanaged
resource. 1 However, during the past decade, companies have begun to focus on
the following:
1) Real estate makes up 25 to 40% of a typical corporation's assets.2
2) US corporate real estate assets amount to greater than $3 trillion.3
3) Real estate expenses are typically second or third highest on the
corporate ledger, only behind payroll and sometimes technology.4
Corporate executives have begun to realize the business value real estate can
have. Facilities lacking the proper location, finance, design, or the proper amount
of flexibility required to manage internal and external uncertainties can impact the
corporation's bottom line. This is true whether the organization lacks the facilities
to take advantage of a growing market opportunity or a long-term commitment
was made to some unnecessary fixed assets. While the organization, its
competitive environment, and the real estate market are constantly changing, the
real estate manager must provide a sound, secure, and stable physical home for
the business, balancing short-term needs w/ long term investments.5
Earlier research has shown that real estate can play a part in reducing
costs, improving efficiency and productivity, accessing and retaining qualified
employees, and satisfying employees.6 Reducing costs is usually the company's
first goal in managing its real estate. Examples include repositioning or selling
owned properties or negotiating favorable leases. A cost reduction goal requires
the standardization of decisions by gathering data on the entire portfolio of
properties. 7The following are steps that can be taken to improve workplace
efficiency:
· Reducing the space per employee through workplace redesign;
· Consolidating workplaces both to eliminate redundant amenities and to
exploit physical adjacencies;
7
* Creating new workplace strategies, such as non-territorial offices, that
intensify space use;
* Making capital improvements that reduce the time and cost of churn
when new product teams are put in place; and,
· Collocating suppliers on-site with production processes.8
Workplace productivity can also be improved in a number of ways. For
example, team spaces can be designed to support product development that
often takes place in cross-functional or cross-disciplinary teams.9 New
technologies can be integrated into the workplace to improve productivity.10
Finally, customer interface can be increased by 1) deploying new technologies to
employees working at home or at telework centers, and 2) by revamping point-of-
sale workplaces to attract, more customers, improve customer service, and
project a consistent product image in the marketplace." Employee satisfaction
can be increased through work at home, by tailoring workplaces to the work that
is done, and by involving employees in the planning and design of such spaces.12
Furthermore, workplace amenities and interaction areas support informal
interaction and teamwork.13 Access to employees is important in industries where
employees are scarce and is best gained through strategic planning for the
corporation's entire portfolio.
More recent research has shown that, real estate can be a source of
competitive advantage by providing additional innovative services, products, and
delivery mechanisms designed to create value for business units.14Such sources
of competitive advantage include 1) economic value-added (EVA), 2) external
customer access and satisfaction, and 3) business continuity. EVA justifies the
cost of a business activity by comparing the cost of equity capital used for plant,
equipment, inventories, and receivables, with the actual return.' 5 Business value
can also be created as customers access corporate facilities for regular
business, or for more sophisticated services such as sales presentations or
product training. Facilities become marketing tools. Brand identity can be
established through facility location and design.' 6 Finally, maintaining business
continuity during corporate reconfigurations can be very complex. The ability to
8
support a business unit through expansion, contraction, or relocation can also
add value to a business unit.
Through the examples given, it can be seen that real estate may have
once been an undermanaged resource but it is now a resource in transition. The
following exhibit summarizes the transition.
Exhibit 1-1
Paradigm Shift in Corporate Real Estate Management
Paradigm
Traditional Strategic
Criteria CRE-Management CRE-Management
Management Custodial oriented view of real Management oriented
Philosophy estate View of real estate
Planning Short to medium-term decision Long-term
Horizon making decision making
Style of Thinking in technical and Thinking in user and
Thinking property-by-property categories Portfolio categories
Behavior
Pattern Reactive Proactive
Self Perception of Engineer Problem-solver
CRE Manager Caretaker Strategist
Personnel
Requirements Experience Experience and creativity
Degree of Information and
Organization Low High
Performance Implicit Explicit
Measurement Performance criteria Performance criteria
Source: Schaefers
Strategic CRE management takes a more formal systematic approach.
This entails "moving beyond reactive and decentralized decision making,
fragmented across the organization, towards a proactive, comprehensive and
portfolio-wide management, well supported by adequate and timely information
and the commitment of top management." 18
9
Social, technological, and organizational changes are further transforming
corporate real estate, making it more complex and challenging. Yet in changing
times, where flexibility is demanded, real estate remains the same fixed
commodity - expensive to build, maintain, and alter. When change makes future
requirements uncertain, the fundamental challenge the organization faces is
forecasting the future. Managing uncertainty is at the core of the real estate
strategy dilemma.19
Globalization of Business - Corporate Real Estate Challenges
Uncertainties are heightened in the global business environment, making
international corporate real estate management that much more challenging.
Some scholars believe that buffering an organization's operations from the
effects of risk is a key responsibility of corporate real estate management.2021
There are unique risks associated with international business including country,
political, economic, currency, and cultural risks, along with industry and firm
specific risks.22 The interrelationships of these risks is what increases the
complexity of doing business internationally and, as a consequence, managing
corporate real estate internationally. Each country has a different set of risks
thereby making standardization much more difficult.
Very few corporations have truly international corporate real estate groups
where strategy is created centrally for the entire portfolio. Strategic planning
increases in importance in the international setting due to the risks and rewards
of executing business strategies increases at the international level.23 There are
a number of explanations for the lack of strategic planning in international CRE
units, where it is needed most. The first reason is that domestic units first get
drawn into international work due to specific projects like developing a building.
Managing the project (strategic programming) detracts from the unit's ability to do
strategic planning.24 Another reason for the lack of strategic planning
internationally is the different ways a business unit and a CRE unit may think
strategically. The complexities of business operations are most familiar to the
business units themselves; keeping up with new technological advances that
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ultimately impact facilities design is challenging. Therefore in working together
there may be differing goals and objectives.25 For example, in developing a
manufacturing plant, the business unit employees will likely focus on the latest
equipment advancements whereas the CRE unit may be concerned merely with
the location and financing of the facility. The final reason for the lack of strategic
planning in international CRE units is that change takes place so quickly in the
international arena that gathering the necessary data to plan on a global scale is
difficult. Keeping up with short-term facility demands is often challenging
enough.26
Along with the lack of centralized real estate strategic planning in
international CRE units, there are gaps in the real estate services provided
internationally. CRE units may provide a limited number of services, or provide
services to a limited number of business units or geographical areas or to a
limited number of property types.27 This suggests that much of the international
real estate is being managed at the business unit level. With that being the case,
and the local business unit lacking real estate experience and knowledge, one
would expect the role of the external real estate service provider to be
heightened in the international arena.28 (Lambert mng global 91-92)
Purpose and MethodoloQv of Thesis
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has opened
28 countries to free markets.(Freedom House) Corporations are hungry to
expand into these new markets which offer the opportunity of serving over 400
million new customers.(Dunning globalization 227) Countries in transition from
planned economies offer tremendous business opportunities for foreign
companies, but at the same time present tremendous challenges. As the largest
sized country in Europe, second only to the European section of the Russian
Federation, Ukraine is no exception.9 Its population ranks fourth largest in the
continent.31 Its 51 million inhabitants have just begun to taste the goods a free
market affords. 32
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This thesis will explore the real estate challenges corporations face when
entering Ukraine.The research was a qualitative exploration comparing and
contrasting information collected from nineteen interviews with other related
available data. This approach was deemed most appropriate based on limitations
in the sources of data available and the scope of a thesis research project. This
thesis considers the following questions:
1) What are the real estate challenges corporations
face when doing business in Ukraine?
2) What strategies have been adopted to overcome
those challenges?
The importance of this work lies in the fact that although international
business is a growing trend and transitional economies offer rapidly growing
business opportunities for corporations, no research could be found about
corporate real estate in transitional economies let alone Ukraine. Due to this, the
thesis will rely heavily on the information obtained through interviewing corporate
real estate executives doing business in Ukraine. Over 250 foreign companies
are doing business in Ukraine. At least forty of these are Fortune 500 or Global
500 companies.
The thesis will be organized as follows. Chapter 2 will introduce the topic
of international business. There will be a brief overview of international business
including recent history, the reasons for the growth of international business, and
followed by a description of the forms of international business, focusing on
foreign direct investment (FDI). To conclude chapter two, the question, why does
FDI occur as opposed to less risky investment forms, will be explained. Chapter
3 will discuss transitional economies, and will act as a bridge between the
discussion on international business and Chapter 4, which will include a brief
historical overview of Ukraine, a description of contemporary challenges
associated with doing business in Ukraine, and a review of the Ukrainian real
estate market. Chapter 5 will summarize the data obtained from nineteen
interviews and other related available data; interviews were held by phone with
eleven US-based corporations in Ukraine, six real estate service firms doing
12
business in Ukraine, and two American real estate consultants with experience in
Ukraine. Conclusions will follow in Chapter 6.
Please note that to preserve anonimity, all identities will remain
confidential with the exception of the featured Coca-Cola case.
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Chapter 2
International Business
History
An explosion in international trade began in 1965.33 After twenty years of
reconstruction following the devastation of WWII, foreign activity rose. Between
1965 and 1995, foreign direct investment (FDI) increased nearly 900% at a 9.5%
annual increase.34 FDI is loosely defined as a significant investment from an
investor into another country in any form of capital be it money, assets,
technology, etc. whereby a significant amount of control/influence over the
investment remains with the investor.35 Most of this outward investment (97%)
came from the seven leading industrialized nations (the United States, United
Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, France, and Canada). The
inward investments went mostly (60%) to those same countries.36
Reasons for Growth of International Business
The following are a number of reasons for the growth of international
business:37
1) Market Expansion- As a firm's ability to produce
surpasses their domestic market's demand, they
expand.
2) Resource Acquisition - Certain inputs, such as
materials, labor, capital, or technology may be
scarce locally.
3) Competitive Forces -Economies of scale force
organizations to grow when their competition
grows just to be able to compete.
4) Technological Change - Advances in
communications, transportation, and information
processing have made managing distant
businesses easier and thus facilitated expansion.
5) Social Changes - Consumers' willingness to
purchase foreign made products has increased.
Certain cultures that shunned foreign products are
now more open.
6) Government Trade and Investment Policies -
Trade and investment barriers have relaxed in
places such as transitional economies.
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The listed reasons for international business growth include supply factors,
demand factors and political factors.38 Market expansion is a demand factor
meaning there is opportunity to take advantage of unmet demand. Social
changes are also demand factors in that consumers' willingness to purchase
foreign made products has increased. The relaxing of trade barriers is a political
factor which can impact foreign business. Resource acquisition, competitive
forces, and technological change are supply related issues impacting foreign
business; supply factors are related to a firm's efforts to control costs. One form
of analysis that will take place later on is to examine what factors were the
motivators for foreign companies to enter the Ukrainian marketplace.
Forms of International Business
There are a number of forms of international business, which can be
broken down into three categories. Exhibit 2-1 outlines in detail the tradeoffs
associated with a number of forms of entry into foreign markets. The first
category of international business is trade, consisting of import and export. Since
the focus of this report is on U.S. corporations doing business in Ukraine, the
attention here will be on exporting, in this case to Ukraine. If a firm offers
products or services and perceives a demand internationally, oftentimes the least
risky and least costly method of selling the product overseas is by export. Three
forms of export include indirect, direct, and intracorporate transfer.3
The second group of forms of international business discussed will be a
group loosely termed contractual agreements. Seven different forms of entry are
included. The common trait they share is that they do not require a presence in
the host country or, as in the case of the turnkey construction contract and the
management contract, are for contractually stated periods of time. Alliances, the
first form of contractual agreement, are rapidly growing, number in the tens of
thousands, and include cooperative agreements that can take many forms such
as sharing, exchanging, or developing new proprietary technology. They usually
entail the transfer of technology in exchange for something else, such as access
to new markets or human capabilities.47
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Exhibit 2-1
TRADEOFFS OF FORM OF ENTRY AND WHEN BEST USED
ENTRY MODE POSITIVES NEGATIVES WHEN USED
Direct Exporting Good 1st Foreign Experience Lack of Local Expertise 1st Foreign
Limited Risk Lack of Local Presence Venture
Proprietary & Marketing Possible Import Barriers
-o Control
a Indirect Exporting Limited Risk Less Control of Marketing When Gaining
Lack of Local Expertise Foreign
Lack of Local Presence Experience is
Possible Import Barriers Not a Concern
Alliance Less Risky, Costly Dependent on Commitment/ Quick Access
Quick Access Incentives w/ Less Cost
Access to Local Expertise Lack of Control
Increasing Popularity Conflicts with Partner
Licensing Low Cost Commitment Weak 1st Foreign Experience Strong Country
Limited Costs/Risks Limited Returns Property Rights
Import Barrier Circumvention Need Attractive Proprietary Protection
Minimized Political Risks Technology/Company Name Import Barriers or
Rapid Access & Expansion Lack of Marketing Control FDI Restrictions
Low Political Risks Risk of Creating a Competitor Small Volume
E Franchising Same as Licensing Same as Licensing Simple Products
· - Form of Licensing Ideal for Easily Transferable and Services
Production Processes not Exportable
_ Contract Low Cost, Quick Entry Difficult to Find Manufacturer Export Restricted
Z Manufacturing Marketing Control Retained Risk of Creating a Competitor or Too Costly
Good for Small Markets Market Too Small
oc Import Barrier Circumvention for FDI
O Turnkey Offers Access to Market Complex Negotiations Typically w/ Host
Construction Involves Costs and Time Governments
Contract Political Risks
Management Low Risk Modest Income In Conjunction w/
Contract Not a Permanent Position JV or Turnkey
in Market Proiects
Countertrade Sometimes Only Way Currency Risk Currency Scarce
to Enter Market or Convertibility
Lacking
Greenfield Investment Full Control Riskiest, Costliest, Slowest Historically Most
aka Wholly Owned Start w/ Clean Slate Lack of Local Expertise Successful
Subsidiary High Profit Potential Lack of Local Recognition Offers Period of
Internal Expansion Gain Market Knowledge Political Risk Acclimatization
Through Experience Managerial Complexities to New Culture
U) Potential Government
__________ _ tRestrictions
> Joint Venture Shared Risk & Cost Loss of Control Quick Access
Typically Encouraged Conflicts w/ Partner w/ Less Cost
X by Host Government
5 Access to Local Expertise
c) and Knowledge
'. ____ _ Speedy, Easy Market Entry
I Merger & Acquisition Shared Responsibilities Costly, Risky Quick Access
Access to Local Expertise Political Risk to New Market/
Speedy Market Entry Managerial Complexities Factor Inputs
High Profit Potential Possible Government
Restrictions
Source: Griffin 16
Alliances are typically formed between medium to large sized multinational
enterprises (MNEs), are popular in high tech manufacturing and information
service companies, and can be put in place between companies in the same field
of work or from different steps of the same value-added chain.4
Other forms of contractual agreements fall under the category of licensing
and include licensing itself, as well as franchising, contract manufacturing, and
the two just mentioned, turnkey construction contracts and manufacturing
contracts.
1) Licensing involves a form of payment for the use
of a company's intangible assets such as
trademarks, patents, know how or brand name.
2) Franchising is a form of licensing, which also
includes some form of technical, management,
and marketing assistance.
3) Contract manufacturing is the combination of
licensing and investing in a foreign country
whereby a contract is made with a foreign firm to
manufacture a product for the sale in the target
country of elsewhere.*
4) A Turnkey construction project involves producing
a foreign project and includes customization of the
product to the point where operations can begin.
This type of deal is typically made with a host
country.
5) A Management contract involves the management
of a facility or business on a contractual basis and
usually is used in conjunction with a joint venture,
which will be discussed shortly, or a turnkey
project.
The final form of entry included here, as a contractual agreement is the
countertrade. Actually a form of payment, countertrade is the purchase of goods
or services paid for with other goods or services (as in barter) or with the
processing or refinement of the goods received (as in counterpurchase or buy-
back).
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We have examined trade and seven forms of contractual agreements, and
will end the discussion on forms of entry into foreign markets by introducing
foreign direct investment. FDI was previously defined as a significant investment
from an investor into another country in any form of capital be it money, assets,
technology, etc. whereby a significant amount of control/influence over the
investment remains with the investor.50 FDI's importance to nations and the
global market economy is increasing.
Exhibit 2-2
World FDI
(Millions of Dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inflows $219,421 $253,506 $328,862 $358,869 $464,341 $643,879
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 1999,
pg. 477.
The current trend in multinational enterprises is not on acquiring natural
resources or seeking out local markets, but rather "to restructure or rationalize
existing investments to capitalize on the benefits of global or regional economic
integration, or to acquire additional technological, organizational or marketing
assets to more effectively pursue, maintain or advance a global competitive
position. ' ' FDI can be divided into the following three categories:
1) New investment in property, plant, or equipment
(Internal Expansion, Greenfield Investment, or
Wholly Owned Subsidiary)
2) Purchasing existing assets (Merger & Acquisition)
3) Joint Venture
Historically, the main form of entry into foreign markets was through
internal expansion. Also known as a greenfield investment or a wholly owned
subsidiary, this form is still numerically significant. As a percentage of the world
wide sales of multinational enterprises (MNEs), those accounted for by fully
owned subsidiaries continues to rise.
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There has been an increase in mergers & acquisitions (M&A) activity since
the mid 80s, particularly in the case of distant investments.52
Exhibit 2-3
Worldwide Cross-border M&A Sales (Majority Foreign-owned)
(In Billions of Dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
219.421 253.506 328.862 358.869 464.341 643.879
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 1999,
pg 525.
Due to the complex nature of calculating annual equity form of FDI, there is
insufficient data to establish a clear relationship between FDI and cross-border
M&A. 5354For the purposes of this report, it can be said that M&A activity is
growing, and, as a form of FDI, has advantages and disadvantages as indicated
previously in Exhibit 2.1.
Data from the US, Japan, and the UK from the early 90s, indicates that the
number of joint ventures has been expanding more rapidly than that of wholly
owned affiliates.55 A joint venture is the creation of a business entity by at least
two entities, each of which has a significant amount of equity interest and
influence in the running of the venture.The reasons for the increase in joint
ventures and other forms of alliances have to do with competitive advantage.
Companies can gain advantage by sharing costs of research and development.
Technology changes so quickly that it is very expensive to keep up. Also by
sharing technology, companies can invent products more rapidly56
Foreign Direct Investment Theory - Why Does It Occur?
A particularly relevant way of looking at FDI in relation to the thesis is to
examine Dunning's Eclectic Theory. Investing in a foreign country is full of risks.
There are numerous ways to participate in international business without having
an actual presence in a foreign country. The following theorizes about why FDI
occurs from a supply side perspective.
According to Dunning's Eclectic Theory, foreign corporate investment is
linked to Ownership, Location, and Internalization Advantages (OLI).
19
Ownership advantages suggest that a domestic
competitive advantage can be used as an advantage
to enter foreign markets and gain market share. For
example, brand name recognition, superior
proprietary information, or economies of scale would
all be reasons why a firm would exploit a competitive
advantage in foreign markets.57
Location advantages are those gained from being in a
foreign country versus being at home. For example, it
would be an advantage to produce in a foreign
country with high import tariffs and low labor costs
versus producing domestically with more expensive
labor and paying the high import tariffs.
Internalization advantages explains why a firm
wouldn't just export its products or use some other
form of "indirect investment" such as franchising or
licensing versus actually physically entering the
market. The principle reason is transaction costs. The
costs of physically entering a market must be
compared with the costs of contracting with another
business through franchising, licensing, or exporting.
Costs include negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing
contracts.58 When the costs associated with
monitoring external contractors or the risk of losing
proprietary information becomes too high, a firm
would choose to internalize the function.62
International Business Synopsis
A number of reasons, theories and examples of international business
have been introduced. It is difficult to pinpoint why a company chooses to invest
as it does, because of the numerous related issues involved. It is typically a
compilation of reasons that result in particular business strategy, and not one
factor like acquiring natural resources or seeking out local markets as noted
previously. As part of the data analysis in chapter 5 the factors motivating the
interviewees to invest in Ukraine will be reported on as well as the form of entry
used in entering Ukraine and any real estate related implications.
20
Chapter 3
Transitional Economies
In a Competitive Global Economy
The opportunities have never been better for MNEs to expand into foreign
markets. Businesses from all around the world are investing globally.
Corporations are entering new markets, yet international business is full of
difficulties and choices. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, for
example, has resulted in the opening of vast new markets. Although there is
great opportunity in Eastern Europe, all of its countries are competing amongst
one another for the foreign investment that will aid in their development. In fact,
as a result of the globalization of business, all the countries in the world are
competing against one another. The competitive nature of globalization has been
studied, theorized and written about by many scholars. However, until recently
the theories had not been quantified. Theories about intercountry competition
were espoused, yet there weren't any score cards, just generalizations about the
determinants for being competitive.
Recent heuristic econometrics has developed the missing scorecards.
Based on scholarly literature about determinants of economic growth, the World
Economic Forum, with the help of Michael Porter, Jeffrey Sachs, and Andrew
Warner, tested eight indicators as forecasters of medium to long term economic
growth within countries. 64 The eight indicators are as follows:
1) Openness to foreign trade and investment
2) Government policy
3) Financial Institutions efficiency
4) Infrastructure quality
5) Technological advancement and absorption
6) Management quality
7) Labor market competitiveness
8) Institutional quality
These indicators were used to create a linear model that would explain the
annual average growth of a country during 1998.5 66
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The result was the Global Competitiveness Report of 1999. The World
Economic Forum has been reporting on competitiveness for a number of years
and the study has grown to rank 59 countries. Countries are added based on the
size of their economy, availability of reliable data and geographic distribution.
Seven transitional economies are on the list with Hungary and the Czech
Republic being ranked the highest (38th and 3 9th respectively) and Ukraine and
Russia being ranked the lowest (58t' and 5 9 th).
As part of a study for the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) to interpret patterns and determinants of transition, Jeffrey
Sachs constructed a benchmark to measure competitiveness of transitional
economies based on the Global Competitiveness Report. While at the Harvard
Institute for International Development (HIID), Sachs developed this as a tool for
USAID to prioritize financial assistance and allocate it where it would have the
greatest impact. This allocation was based on the theory that the better a
country's rank in an indicator or sub-indicator, the more likely any further
assistance would be subject to diminishing returns. With the results of the study,
USAID could tailor their assistance to where it would do the most good, track
progress in reform, and set up benchmarks as a guide to determine when to start
and stop funding.68'6 70
Exhibit 3-1 on the following page compiles both the Global
Competitiveness Rankings and the Transitional Economies' rankings and
illustrates how competitive the transitional economies are in comparison to the
countries in the global report. Not only are these competitiveness rankings of
benefit to USAID and other Assistance programs, but they are also beneficial to
the countries as a benchmark for identifying areas in need of most improvement.
More related to the topic at hand, however, is the benefit to foreign investors
such as corporations. The reports are a compilation of quantitative and
qualitative factors that can be used by corporations in choosing where to locate
affiliates.
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Sources: The Global Competitiveness Report 1999,
Benchmarking Competitiveness in Transitional Economies
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Another interesting compilation of information addressing competitiveness
of the nations included is Nations in Transit 1998.71 This report rates 28
transitional economies for 11 categories including Political Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media, Government and Public Administration, Rule of Law,
Corruption, Privatization, Macroeconomic Policy, Microeconomic Policy,
Democratic Reform (unweighted average of first five categories), and Economic
Reform (unweighted average of last three categories). An explanation for each
country is also included in the report.
Nations in Transit 1998 Ratings Summary
PP CS IM GPA ROL CO P MA MI Democ Econ
Albania 4.50 4.25 4.75 5.00 5.25 D 4.00 5.00 4.50 4.69 4.50
Armenia 5.75 3.50 5.25 4.50 5.00 D 3.75 4.25 4.25 4.88 4.08
Azerbaijan 5.50 5.00 5.50 6.25 5.50 D 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.38 5.00
Belarus 6.25 5.75 6.50 6.25 6.25 C 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.19 6.25
Bosnia 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.50 C 6.50 6.00 6.00 6.19 6.17
Bulgaria 2.75 3.75 3.50 4.00 3.75 C 4.00 4.00 4.25 3.44 4.08
Croatia 4.25 3.50 4.75 4.00 4.75 C 4.00 3.75 3.75 4.31 3.83
Czech Rep. 1.25 1.50 1.25 2.00 1.50 B 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.38 2.00
Estonia 1.75 2.25 1.75 2.25 2.25 B 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Georgia 4.50 4.25 4.25 5.00 4.75 C 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.44 4.00
Hungary 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.75 1.75 A 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.44 1.67
Kazakhstan 5.50 5.00 5.50 5.50 5.25 D 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.31 4.50
Kyrgyz Rep. 5.00 4.50 5.00 4.50 4.50 D 4.25 3.50 3.50 4.75 3.75
Latvia 2.00 2.25 1.75 2.50 2.25 B 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.06 2.50
Lithuania 1.75 2.00 1.50 2.50 2.00 B 2.25 2.75 2.75 1.81 2.58
Macedonia 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.50 C 4.00 5.00 5.00 3.94 4.67
Moldova 3.50 3.75 4.25 4.50 4.00 C 4.00 4.25 4.25 3.88 4.17
Mongolia 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 C 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.19 4.00
Poland 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.75 1.50 A 2.25 1.75 1.75 1.38 1.92
Romania 3.25 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.25 C 4.50 4.50 4.50 3.81 4.50
Russia 3.50 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.25 D 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 3.92
Slovakia 3.50 3.00 4.00 3.75 4.00 C 3.25 3.75 3.75 3.63 3.58
Slovenia 2.00 2.00 1.75 2.50 1.50 A 2.50 2.00 2.00 1.81 2.17
Tajikistan 5.75 5.25 6.00 6.75 6.00 D 6.25 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.13
Turkmenistan 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.75 6.75 D 6.75 6.25 6.25 6.94 6.42
Ukraine 3.50 4.25 4.75 4.75 4.00 D 4.50 4.50 5.25 4.13 4.75
Uzbekistan 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.25 6.50 D 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.25
Yugoslavia I 5.00 J 5.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 D J 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.88 4.83
Notes: ratings are on a one-to-seven scale, with a one representing the highest and a seven representing
the lowest level of progress. Corruption was rated "A" to "D", with an "A" representing the highest level
of progress, or least amount of corruption.
PP-Political Process CS-Civil Society IM-Independent Media GPA-Government and Public Administration
ROL-Rule of Law CO-Corruption P-Privatization MA-Macroeconomic Policy MI-Microeconomic Policy
Source: Freedom House
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These three reports provide data regarding the existing state of business
in the nations included in the reports. The Nations in Transit ratings summary
examined twenty-eight transitional countries on the basis of the eleven factors
noted. The Global Competitiveness Report and Benchmarking Competitiveness
in Transitional Economies together show how the transitional economies
compete against the rest of the world. The data regarding Ukraine paints a
challenging business environment and is presented here as background
information about Ukraine.
Foreign Direct Investment Trends in Transitional Economies
In 1992, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) conducted a survey of roughly 300 companies to assess the factors that
western companies considered before making investment decisions in twelve
Central and Eastern European (C&EE) and Former Soviet Union (FSU)
countries, including Ukraine.
Traditional advantages such as low labor costs, cheap resources, and
investment incentives, though considered, were not primary motivators for
investing, and were perceived as short-term benefits only. 72Many corporations
anticipated that privatization of core industries would lead to opportunities to
create satellite businesses that support those core privatized businesses. 3 This
is consistent with the reasons influencing foreign investing introduced earlier.
While most corporations are focusing on demand factors (market expansion),
supply factors (labor and resources) and political factors (investment incentives),
the primary factor however in companies interviewed by OECD for investing in
transitional economies appears to be market expansion.
The OECD survey found the following constraints involved in corporate
investments in these countries:
1) Central bureaucratic, administrative and legislative
issues,
2) Protracted and complex negotiations or approval
procedures,
3) Frequent changes of government officials and
difficulties in finding the decision makers who
would accept responsibility,
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4) Inconsistent views and policy changes,
5) Conflicting information from different ministries,
6) Government strategies being ill defined,
ambiguous, and lacking a determined long-term
strategy.7 4
These challenges merely impeded the investment process rather than prevented
it.
UK Company (Construction and Development): "The
internal politics of the Czech Republic dragged it out a
lot. What we did buy was very different from what we
started to buy. The mixture of politics and
bureaucracy - you need 44 permissions to do
something."76
US Company (Construction & Property Development
Company): There are three principles [barriers] under
the general headings of lack of understanding and
perception of bureaucracy: 1) A lack of clear title and
emergence of former owners. We had a former owner
come forward and her claim was valid. It delayed the
opening and we had to reach an accord. 2) In many
cases there is an unwillingness of the bureaucracy
both the local and federal to be helpful to private
business. They don't see it as their business to help
private business. At best they are neutral and at their
worst they are obstructive. They are suspicious just
because these companies are there. 3) The business
of getting the bureaucracy to agree to what their
obligations are and to fulfill them. These kinds of
things create a moving target. The laws change daily
and extra costs appear which you hadn't expected;
legal, tax, VAT, sales tax which you find are different
after the fact."77
Other problems included slowly developing business infrastructure in areas of
banking, communications, and distribution, human resource inadequacies,
changing legislative framework, and ineffective judicial apparatus for
enforcement of existing laws.78 The constraints identified are similar to those
mentioned in the competitiveness reports previously, suggesting that these
countries present a challenging environment in which to do business.
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Austrian Company (Construction and Property
Development):"Problems of mentality the people there
just don't understand how critically we see it all. They
don't understand anything about write-off, risks etc.
The people just think 'planned economy' they haven't
changed their way of thinking yet."79
UK Company (Construction and Property
Development): "Decent financial information on
potential partners is difficult to get due to the lack of a
commercial infrastructure.'w
Austrian Company (Construction and Property
Development): "The people just don't understand a
market economy. They have other expectations, their
attitude is still completely different. '"8
Investment preferences
The joint venture form of investment was previously noted as gaining in
popularity in the global business environment. The most popular form of
investment in the transitional economies studied by OECD was the joint venture.
Ninety out of 174 responses to the OECD survey preferred joint ventures due to
local knowledge and contacts, immediate access to domestic market, ability to
acquire certain operations of the local company and thus reduce initial
investment requirements, ability to gain market share and presence.82
Acquisitions were used 39 times, with the foreign company being a majority
owner in 31 cases, while greenfield developments were used 37 times. The main
reasons given for acquiring operations were to gain market share, acquire an
existing brand name, to develop own brand names, and to speed up entry at a
lower cost than greenfield developments. Greenfields were chosen when
companies sought 100% ownership or were unable to locate other opportunities,
like appropriate partners. Overall, minority shareholdings in companies were not
preferred and only chosen when: 1) corporations wished to position themselves
in a market in order to be best placed to take advantage when it developed, 2)
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Corporates were adopting a risk averse entry into a market, 3) Corporates were
investing as part of a consortium.83
The reasons given for selecting joint ventures and acquisitions appear to
address the constraints of doing business in transitional economies mentioned in
the previous section. Essentially the constraints mentioned, referred to
inadequate administrative and business infrastructure. The responses here
regarding reasons for choosing a particular form of entry such as a joint venture
indicate that speed of access to the market was a concern as was local contacts
and knowledge. This suggests that entering the market in other forms would not
be speedy or that a lack of local contacts may also hinder business progress.
Both issues point to either inadequate administrative or business infrastructure;
this is consistent with general foreign investment theory which suggests that joint
ventures and M&A are speedier forms of entry into new markets versus a
greenfield investment.
A survey of 79 US business executives, which was completed by three US
business school researchers in August of 1990, ranked modalities most likely to
exploit East European markets.84 The following are the rankings from 1990's
survey:
1 Exporting from West European subsidiary
2 Exporting from the US
3 Licensing
4 Bartering
5 JV w/ US minority interest
6 Countertrade
7 JV w/ US majority interest
8 Wholly owned subsidiary
What the ratings appear to indicate is that the respondents felt that the least risky
forms of investment would be those preferable. The highest rated form of direct
investment, the joint venture was rated fifth. Numbers were not available to
compare the amounts of business that took place in the above forms of business,
since the survey took place. One interesting side note though is that between
1993 and 1998, the amount of annual FDI that flowed into Central and Eastern
Europe nearly tripled.
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Country popularity
When asked what countries companies did business in or were
considering, Hungary came in first followed by Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia,
Russia, and Ukraine. German and US-based companies were particularly
interested in Ukraine. The OECD survey is corroborated by another source,
which states that most joint ventures registered between 1988 and 1991 were in
Poland and in Hungary and in the service sector, although only 10% of these
joint ventures were operational in 1991 .85 It was noted that some Western
manufacturers switched locations of ventures from the Iberian Peninsula &
Greece to Central and Eastern Europe to take advantage of lower wages and
transport costs and in some cases well trained skilled labor force. 86 This may
suggest a demand for locations with low cost labor and transport costs such as
Ukraine. Results since the survey indicate a few changes. Poland, in 1996
became the region's most popular country for foreign investment. Russia, on top
in 1997, was hurt the worst as a result of its loan defaults in 1998; its FDI
dropped 60% that year. Otherwise the region as a whole gained 26% from 1997.
Since 1993, Hungary's rank has fallen from number one to fifth place; Lithuania
and Romania have both climbed the ranking scale.
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Exhibit 3-3
FDI Inflows, by region and country, 1993-1998
(Millions of Dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Central and Eastern Europe 6,757 5,932 14,266 12,406 18,532 17,513
Albania 68 53 70 90 48 45
Belarus 18 11 15 73 200 144
Bulgaria 40 105 90 109 505 401
Czech Republic 653 868 2,561 1,429 1,301 540
Estonia 162 214 201 151 267 581
Hungary 2,339 1,146 4,453 1,983 2,085 1,935
Latvia 45 214 180 382 521 274
Lithuania 30 31 73 152 355 926
Moldova 14 28 67 24 72 85
Poland 1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 5,129
Romania 94 342 420 265 1,229 2,063
Russian Federation 1,211 640 2,016 2,479 6,243 2,183
Slovakia 168 245 195 251 177 466
Ukraine 200 159 267 521 624 743
Source: World Investment Report 1999, pg. 480.
Synopsis of Transitional Economies
The opportunities for FDI in transitional economies center around three
factors: 1) low-cost, highly skilled labor force, 2) an abundance of natural
resources, and 3) market share potential. In 1990, the Former Soviet Union,
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, with a
total population of over 400 million, received the same amount of investment as
Ireland and Norway combined, each with a population of 5 million.87 The growth
in Central and Eastern Europe has increased at nearly twice the rate of that of
Ireland and Norway combined since 1990. The initial enthusiasm, however, has
been replaced with a greater awareness of the challenges of doing business in a
transitional economy including:
1. Uncertainties about legal instabilities
2. Ownership restrictions
3. Currency inconvertibility and supply constraints
4. Absence of the required legal accounting and financial
infrastructure
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This is compounded by the need for reform in many areas including: the areas of
institutional structure, management, access to foreign markets, entrepreneurial
and work culture, organizational capabilities and monetary incentives to
efficiently utilize and upgrade resources and capabilities. 88
It is not appropriate to over categorize or generalize about the region
because each country is in a different stage of developing their economy, political
system, and institutional framework. The next chapter will include details from the
competitiveness reports in order to give a more detailed background on the
business environment in Ukraine.
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Chapter 4
Ukraine
History
Very little is known about this country whose history dates back to the first
millennium BC. Highlights of its early history include the introduction of
Christianity by Volodymyr the Great in 988 and the legendary freedom fighting
Cossacks dating back to the 15th century. The Cossacks were constantly
defending the fertile Ukraine, once known as the "Bread Basket of Europe".
Through the centuries, Ukraine fell under control of numerous other
empires. Entering World War I, Ukraine was under the Russian and Austrian
Empires. With the collapse of these two empires, Ukraine once again gained
independence in 1918, albeit short-lived. The Bolsheviks conquered most of
Ukraine in 1922. The western territories were occupied by various countries,
mostly Poland, until World War II when all of Ukraine became a part of the Soviet
Union.
History has shown, with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak
Republics, that the shorter the period of time a country falls under communist
control, the easier the transition to a market economy. Western Ukraine came
under communist control after WVWII, much later than Eastern Ukraine. After the
1991 declaration of independence from the former Soviet State by all its
republics, a democratic system of government was formed with a free market
economy. By most expert accounts, Western Ukraine accepted the free market
system more openly and based on the experiences of the countries mentioned,
should have an easier transition to a market economy.
Transition Since Independence
Since 1991, Ukraine has destroyed its nuclear stockpiles, adopted a new
constitution, and developed its own armed forces, currency, banking system, and
stock exchange. It is slowly privatizing government-owned land and enterprises,
and has curbed hyperinflation rates that reached as high as 10,155% per annum
in 1993.
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Ukraine has a parliamentary form of government with a presiding
president. The most powerful parties in parliament are the following:
Communists, Narodny Rukh "People's Movement", Greens Party, People's
Democratic Party, Hromada "The Masses" Party, Progressive Socialists,
Socialists, Agrarian Party, and the Social Democratic Party.89 Ukraine is a
member of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and NATO's Partnership
for Peace.
The transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic
system in all of Ukraine continues to be difficult, nine years after independence.
Rich in natural and human resources, geographical location, and to a lesser
extent transportation and utility infrastructure, and industrialization, it would
appear as though the future should be bright. Yet gross domestic product, (GDP)
has dropped every year since the declaration of independence. There is hope
however, since GDP grew the first half of this year.
Exhibit 4-1
Change in Ukrainian GDP and Exchange Rate
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP -13.7 -14 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.2 -1.5 -0.4
(% annual
change)
Exchange - - - - 1.8 1.9 3.4 4.1
Rate
(Hryvna: US$)
Sources: Ukraine Embassy in Canada, http://www.cyberus.ca/-ukremb/bus uide.shtml
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada,
http://www.dfait-maeci.c.ca/enelish/eo/europe/87268-e.htm
Investment in Ukraine
Climate
Between 1987 and 1997, industrial output in Ukraine decreased by an
annual average of 16.4%. The manufacturing sector contracted by an annual
average of 15.9%gand the service sector shrunk by an 8.6% annual average.91
Production suffered due to outdated, inefficient, and poorly maintained
equipment. Enterprises, operating without subsidies received in the planned
economy have been in dismal financial states in the new market economy,
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unable to pay wages let alone invest in new equipment.92 Financing for
investment in the outmoded capital stock is unavailable due to the immature
banking system. As domestic assets deteriorate, and financing is not available
domestically, foreign aid or investment is relied upon to provide financing and
other inputs for economic growth.
Privatization - an Opportunity for Investment
One way foreign investment can take place is through privatization, the
process whereby government owned property is relinquished to the private
sector. Funds from the sale of property go to the government and can be used to
pay other obligations of the government. More importantly, privatization can be
used as a tool for reform. By selling companies to capitalized investors, the
deteriorated stock of assets can begin to be updated. Management know-how is
also a consideration. By selling to investors with managerial or technological
knowledge, the base of knowledge in the country is raised. Productivity, quality
and international competitiveness improves.
There were several aspects of privatization in Ukraine that ran counter to
the theory explained above. First, many small businesses, were leased or sold to
workers, lacking not only management skills, but also the necessary working
capital. Many are on the verge of bankruptcy. Second, many Ukrainian
businessmen took advantage of contacts and weak laws in privatizing
enterprises in obtaining ownership of companies.93 Finally, large state
enterprises in Ukraine sometimes retain a state holding of 80% or more of the
joint stock company. "Strategic enterprises", those in the areas of defense, heavy
industry, transport, and communications offer the best prospects for FDI, but
remain off limits to privatization. So far, no foreign company has acquired a
privatized enterprise, and investors often complain of difficulties in determining
whom to deal with when negotiating a joint venture.9495
Impediments to Investment in Ukraine
There are many advantages of foreign investment for a host country,
however, there are significant challenges that foreigners face when investing in
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Ukraine. Animosity towards foreign investors is one.9697 Part of the reason is
mistrust.
"They love investment but hate investors."
(According to an Investor in Ukraine who, for four
years, fought for an investment of $50 million US
Dollars that would save several hundred jobs but has
still made no headway. Meanwhile the investment
project is on the verge of bankruptcy.)98
In a meeting with the "German Advisory Group with the Ukrainian
Government in Kyiv" in August, 1997, Ukrainian President Kuchma asked about
the reasons behind the low levels of foreign investment in Ukraine.99 The
German Advisory Group, led by Felicitas Mollers, interviewed twenty companies
that had $540 million US Dollars invested in Ukraine, over one-third of all FDI in
Ukraine at that time. Companies representing 11 industries and 8 countries, 10
from Germany, were asked about the impediments to investing in Ukraine. The
following chart includes results from questions to companies investing in Russia
and the Czech Republic, as well as the results for Central and Eastern Europe as
a whole:
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Exhibit 4-2
Impediments to Investing in the Following Transitional Economies
Rank Impediment to Investing Ukraine C&EE Russia Czech
1 Legal Uncertainty 100 37 70 -17.2
2 Unsatisfactory transport 97.5 -4.4 14.2 -31
infrastructure
3 Government failure to abide by 90 -42.4 -30 -92.8
commitments
4 Government control and remnants 80 21.2 60 -35.8
of command economy an
impediment
5 Lack of telecommunications 80 -16.6 14.2 -31
infrastructure
6 Lack of support from the 75 1.2 33.4 -7.2
authorities
7 Corruption 75 -19.8 -8.7 -72.4
8 Obtaining planning permission 60 -56.4 -46.6 -40.8
takes too long
9 Poor economic scenario 55 20.2 72.8 -57.2
10 Difficulties with local banks 10 -26.4 -20 -38
11 Inadequate distribution 5 -20.4 22.2 -31
infrastructure
12 Delivery reliability and punctuality 5 -6.6 42.8 -28.6
deficient
13 Difficulty obtaining real estate 0 -19.6 -10 -31
14 Low productivity -10 7.2 60 7.2
15 Organized crime -10 -36.4 -34.8 -85.8
16 Environmental constraints -15 -74.8 -68.4 65.4
17 Workers' quality awareness too -15 -20.4 -4.8 -24.2
low
18 Unreliability of staff -50 -54.6 -30 -48.2
19 Poorly trained labor -60 -43.6 -20 -38
20 Low level of staff commitment -60 -60 -40 -42.8
Note: Scores are the balance between affirmative
Source: Ukraine at the Crossroads, 146-7.
and negative replies in %.
Five of the top seven impediments are related to administrative infrastructure,
indicating that the biggest impediment to doing business in Ukraine for these
companies is the government. Along with administrative infrastructure,
unsatisfactory transport infrastructure (ranked 2nd), lack of telecommunications
infrastructure (5 th), obtaining planning permission takes too long (8th), difficulties
with local banks (10th), and difficulty obtaining real estate (13th) are all real estate
related challenges which will be addressed in chapter 5.
Earlier in chapter 3 on transitional economies, it was noted that Ukraine
ranked 58th out of 59 countries that were included in The Global Competitiveness
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Report. The report ranked a country's competitiveness by forecasting its medium
to long-term economic growth potential based on the following eight indicators:
Exhibit 4-3
Ukraine's Ranking in the Eight Variables of the Global Competitiveness
The following is a list of just a few of the specific subvariables measured by The
Global Competitiveness Report. Subvariables that were considered to be
liabilities for Ukraine include the following with Ukraine's rank out of 59 in
parenthesis:
Openness
Access to foreign capital markets (56)
Hidden import barriers (56)
Tariffs and quotas (58)
Government
Tax evasion (57)
Tax system (59)
Government bureaucracy (59)
Finance
Financial regulation & supervision (56)
Sophistication of financial markets (57)
Access to credit (58)
Country credit rating (59)
Infrastructure
Roads (56)
Private investments in infrastructure (56)
Air Transport (57)
International telephone service (57)
Cellular telephones (58)
Telephones and fax machines (58)
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Report
Ukraine's Rank
Out of 59 Countries
1) Openness to foreign trade and investment 58
2) Government policy 48
3) Financial Institutions efficiency 59
4) Infrastructure quality 59
5) Technological advancement and absorption 54
6) Management quality 55
7) Labor market competitiveness 21
8) Institutional quality 56
Infrastructure and financing (59)
Technology
Computer use (56)
Technological sophistication (58)
Private sector spending on R&D (58)
Management
Production processes (56)
Compensation policies (57)
Approach to human resources (58)
Institutions
Trust in politicians' honesty (56)
Government favoritism (57)
Bribes and kickbacks (57)
Compliance (58)
The ratings of Ukraine's competitive advantages and disadvantages are
consistent with the survey of twenty foreign companies noted earlier in this
section. The primary advantage of investing in Ukraine was labor market
competitiveness. While labor costs have been viewed, as a supply factor which
influence foreign investment decisions (see chapter 2), the OECD report in
chapter 3 on transitional economies indicated labor costs were not a primary
influence in investing in a country.
Motives for Investing in Ukraine
With such a dismal outlook for the attractiveness of the Ukrainian
landscape as place to do business, it would seem highly unlikely that investment
would take place. The German Advisory Group's survey that researched the
impediments to investing in Ukraine also investigated the motives. The following
exhibit compares results of Ukraine with Central and Eastern Europe as a whole,
Russia, and the Czech Republic.
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Exhibit 4-4
Rank Motives for Investing in Ukraine C&EE Russia Czech
Ukraine
1 Secure potential sales markets 3.65 3.08 2.96 2.63
2 Develop new sales markets 3.5 3.22 2.95 2.75
3 Overcome import barriers 2.5 1.36 1.72 .85
4 Secure and cultivate existing sales 1.7 2.7 3 2.57
markets
5 Enhance competitiveness through 1.58 2.12 1.94 2.72
primary production in the host
country
6 Lower labor costs 1.4 2.76 2.16 3.34
7 Lower tax burden 1.1 1.46 1.58 1.48
8 Better purchasing and 1.2 1.34 1.58 1.11
procurement possibilities
9 Longer working hours .68 1.38 .95 1.73
10 Fewer administrative impediments .55 1.18 1.83 .96
11 Longer machine running times .54 1.21 .79 2
12 Less stringent environmental .33 .73 .58 .81
constraints
Note: Average scores are based on scaled responses with
(=3), 'slight motive' (=1), and 'unimportant' (=0).
Source: Ukraine at the Crossroads, 144-6.
'very great motive' (=4), 'great motive'
The twenty interviewees were given twelve motives to score; three were
sales related and the other nine were cost or location related. The results are
very clear in the case of Ukraine. The three sales-related motives ranked first,
second and fourth. The conclusion is that the primary reason for companies to
undertake the difficulties associated with direct investment in Ukraine is market
opportunity. Another reason to invest in Ukraine as opposed to exporting to
Ukraine is to avoid import barriers. Meanwhile cost and locational considerations
are not significant reasons for investing in Ukraine.
The findings here are consistent with what was found in chapter 3 with
investment in transitional economies. Companies were interested in speed to
market and concerned about administrative and business infrastructure. Those
companies participating in the OECD survey found the joint venture the best
route to enter the market. Chapter 5 will examine some of the real estate impacts
associated with this form of investment.
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FDI in Ukraine
Exhibit 4-5
FDI Comparison between Select Central and Eastern European Countries, 1998
Total Running Population Per Capita
Volume of FDI (Millions) FDI
(Millions of Dollars) (In Dollars)
Belarus 466 10.2 46
Bulgaria 1,352 8.1 167
Czech Republic 13,457 10.3 1307
Estonia 1,822 1.5 1215
Hungary 18,255 10.2 1790
Latvia 1,488 2.5 595
Lithuania 1,625 3.7 439
Poland 21,722 38.6 563
Romania 4,250 22.6 188
Russian Federation 13,389 147.7 91
Slovakia 2,062 5.4 382
Ukraine 2,801 51.1 55
Total 82,689 311.9 265
Source:World Investment Report 1999, pg. 492; Ukraine at the Crossroads, 140.
The chart shows that in absolute terms, up to 1998, Ukraine received the 6 th
highest cumulative amount of FDI (stock) of the select countries listed. However,
Ukraine ranked 2nd to last in terms of per capita FDI allotment.
The sources of this inward FDI stock into Ukraine are Europe (31%),
United States (18%), Russia (7%), Korea (7%), and Cyprus (5%).100 The
percentage amount invested in Ukraine from Europe was at the bottom of the
percentage scale in comparison to other Central and Eastern European
countries.
The sectoral distribution, into which FDI is flowing, is broken up into
primary (agriculture and mining) sector (4%), secondary (or manufacturing)
sector (43%), and tertiary (or services) sector (40%). This data is consistent with
data from other Eastern and Central European countries.
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Ukrainian Real Estate
There is "BC" and "AC" in Ukrainian real estate markets- meaning before
crisis and after crisis. The Russian government's default on its debts in mid 1998
produced a downward spiraling effect on business in general in Russia, which
reached Ukraine months later. The result was a turning point for the real estate
markets in Ukraine.
Office Market
"BC", real estate prices were soaring as a result of a lack of supply of
"class A style" space. International corporations and government agencies were
saturating the market. During 1998, development began to alleviate the space
disequilibrium. 101 A huge oversupply resulted which was exacerbated by the
financial crisis. Market rates dropped "AC" and began to stabilize in early 2000.
Office rates, which peaked "BC" at between $50-100 USD per square meter per
month ($55-110 per square foot per year), tumbled to $20-30 USD per sq. m. per
month. There remains an oversupply of space where, at the present time with the
worst quality and locations can currently be leased for $5. Demand is typically for
2,000 to 5,000 square feet of space; lease terms range between one to five
years.
Office space falls into three distinct categories: 1) modern amenitized,
which resulted from new construction 2) local government owned, and 3)
converted apartment space. The first category is used by multinational
enterprises while the latter two categories, are occupied by the remaining 95% of
users consisting of local companies and government.
Residential Market
Similar to office space, supply has outpaced demand and prices have
dropped. Typical purchases require full payment in advance. New construction
affords larger, better-planned units with a variety of financing options all at a
higher price. According to Nadiya Moiseyenko, Director of Key Realty in Kyiv, the
biggest problem in the real estate market is the lack of large, high-quality
residences. For example, a remnant from the soviet system is communal
apartments. Ms. Moiseyenko explains that these units housed up to 5 families
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each having one private room, sharing one toilet, one bathroom (tub and sink),
and a kitchen with one stove per family. Expatriates prefer large high-quality units
close to the city center. Ukrainians tend to purchase the unrenovated apartments
then fix them up, as opposed to Westerners who buy ready to move into space at
a premium.
The chart below shows the prices for apartment in Kyiv. Please note the
steep rent gradients. As you move from the city center, prices drop dramatically.
Exhibit 4-6
The Cost of A artments in Kyiv in US Dollars
City District One-room Two-room Three-room Cost per
apartment apartment apartment sq. meter
Center 18,000 30,000 53,000 673
Pechersk 15,000 21,000 33,000 460
Podol 12,000 17,000 25,000 360
Source: Tanya Tyagur, Kiv's Apartments Continue to Go Down in Price 6/14/00 wuw.ukraine-
observer.com/last/archive/archl5/trelds6.html.
Fraudulent transactions are not uncommon. 1 3 One example is renting
apartments to multiple tenants with fake documents. By signing up multiple
tenants with up front deposits and rent fees, fake landlords can escape with large
profits. A form of misrepresentation that occurs intentionally as well as
unintentionally, is when the lessor does not possess clear title to the property
being leased.
Manufacturing Space Market
The manufacturing space market is not adequately developed. Most
manufacturing transactions occur through privatization of soviet plants in need of
total rehab. Most space is multi-story, has low ceilings, and is poorly ventilated,
obsolescent space. If plants are needed, however at present there is not a strong
demand for developing manufacturing plants due to the market
immaturity/environment.
Warehouse Space Market
There is a glut of poor quality, soviet style warehouse space, however,
modern warehouse space is also almost nonexistent and rents for $5 USD per
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sq. m. per month. Warehouse space tends to follow more developed markets.
Full-height loading bays, serviceable storage racks, flooring suitable for forklift
trucks are scarce luxuries.
Retail Space Market
Retail space offers the developer the best opportunity since quality space
is almost nonexistent. The top-notch city center space goes for $130 per square
meter a month, but drops off drastically all the way down to $40 due to the steep
rent gradient in the city center.
Early entrants into the retail market include Benetton, Reebok, Adidas,
Lee/Vrangler, Hugo Boss, Nike, Levi's, and McDonald's, which has 30
restaurants throughout Ukraine with expansion plans for 85 more in the next five
years. The supermarket concept is already being developed. Future trends
include the development of Big Box retail outlets and the redevelopment of old
Soviet style department stores. The caveat is the small but increasing number of
customers with purchasing power.
Hotel Space Market
An important part of the business infrastructure deficiency has been the
lack of a quality hotel in Kyiv. Plans for a 288 room Hilton Hotel and the Radisson
SAS were supposed to change that. However, dogged by government approval
bureaucracy, these projects remain stifled. While other hotel operators are
investigating opportunities the Hotel Intercontinental may be the first hotel
finished sometime in 2001. Officials believe that the hotel additions will improve
the impressions international business executives have of Kyiv as a business
center.
Synopsis
The real estate data for Ukraine indicates that there does not appear to be
any difficulty in obtaining office space. This contradicts the literature reviewed
which states that obtaining real estate is an impediment to doing business. This
does not mean, however, that the real estate available is adequate to meet the
needs of companies that are making investments in Ukraine. Companies from
both the service and manufacturing sectors have been interviewed about the
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types of space they use. Their challenges and practices will be compared against
the data just reviewed related to the real estate space markets in Ukraine.
44
Chapter 5
Data Analysis - Mana-ging Corporate Real Estate in Ukraine
Insights
When my research on corporate real estate in Ukraine began, I expected
to find the lack of real estate expertise at the local business level. Managing
corporate real estate for a large multinational enterprise on a global scale is
highly complex. Few companies have truly international real estate units which
centrally create strategy, or even standards, for all their business units, and
property types. Therefore, it was assumed that the local business units of large
multinational firms managed their own real estate in conjunction with a real
estate group at regional headquarters or by themselves. Due to the lack of real
estate expertise or experience at the business unit level in Ukraine, it was felt
that external real estate service providers would play an important role in the
management of corporate real estate in Ukraine. This was not the case in the
majority of companies interviewed.
Decision Making Process
For all the companies I spoke with, the decision making process takes
place in Ukraine without any outside input or interference. In some cases it was
noted that a company had the advisory services of a regional headquarters
available to them. On of the most striking aspects of the decision making
process, however, was the assortment of different employees regarded as being
in charge of real estate. I spoke with sales directors, logistics supervisors, human
resource coordinators, public affairs representatives as well as directors of the
company. In no case did the employee making real estate decisions have a
position that was real estate related. Terry Pickard, a real estate service provider
in Ukraine for over eight years, recently noted that the employee in charge of
facilities "already has a full time job to do on which his further corporate career
will be judged, so [facilities management] is regularly put to one side while he
concentrates on more important issues."104 An example from Pickard that
illustrates how undermanaged corporate real estate in Ukraine can be is the
"expat" on a 3 year corporate rotation being in charge of facilities. His medium to
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long-term mistakes will become the responsibility of his successor long after his
tour ends. The following is an another example cited by Pickard.
While this research did not reveal such inefficiencies, the lack of real
estate expertise in the local business units was apparent.
Real Estate Service Provider Usage
As evidenced in the preceding example, often times those responsible for
managing corporate real estate in Ukraine are inexperienced and untrained. It
would reasonably follow that, without in-house real estate expertise, corporations
would use real estate service providers. This is not what the interviews indicated.
Upcoming Exhibits 5-2 and 5-3 show that almost all of the respondents have
used brokers for one service or another. However, this type of usage was
infrequent and often times the company would end up finding space on their own.
When the manufacturing companies developed properties, they had construction
and project management needs that were outsourced. Legal services were used
as well. For example, one company changed the company business entity from a
consortium to an LLC in order to transfer the rights to the property from the State
to the business entity. Another example of a legal service used would be an
evaluation of the title to confirm that there are no entities, other than the so-called
designated owner, that have legal interests in the property.
The hesitance to use a broker for tenant representation was found to
center around the cost of such services and the ability of the companies to
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Exhibit 5-1
A marketing manager.signed an office lease to the dismay of his director who
canceled the contract resulting in a cancellation penalty. The marketing
manager signed another lease for 5 years with options on the whole building.
They spent $30,000: building cubicles on an open floor plan and installed a
telephone network as well. :A new director was appointed who did not like the
office so a supposed American specialist from Russia was called in to: find a
new office in Ukraine. At the end of 1998,: they signed a contract for 3 years
starting June 1999, at $40 per sq. m. with .2 years prepayment.
They didn't move in until July 1999, and the old landlordwon a
settlement of $750,000 for breach of contract.
Total cost - possibly- close to $2 million.
--- .-~ ~ ~~~~.
handle the job themselves. Unlike in the United States, where often times the
broker's fee is paid by the landlord or seller, in Ukraine the tenant typically pays
for the broker's services over and above the sale price or rent to be paid. This
was especially the case prior to the crisis when demand outstripped supply.
However, now with supply being greater than demand in most markets such as
office space, it is not uncommon to see landlords pay the broker's fee. On the
other hand, one of the brokers interviewed noted their clients are primarily repeat
customers or referrals that pay their fees. For example, this broker is able to
obtain information on the availability of popular, large, high-quality apartment
space is in demand, based on past relationships and referrals. Apparently to their
customers, the fees are worth the service.
Along with the cost of broker representation, the ability to handle the job
themselves was another reason for the lack of reliance on real estate service
providers. Two points were made to support this. First, for most companies in
Ukraine, the primary real estate function is administering the lease or finding new
office space. Before the crisis, finding space may have been difficult, but now it is
not in most cases. Furthermore, if a company merely needs a small office, then it
shouldn't be too difficult and, in many cases, the larger real estate service
providers do not even take on that scale of assignment. An exception to this
might be performing work on behalf of an important client outside Ukraine. One
service provider noted that their minimum space request required in order to get
involved is 150 square meters (approximately 1500 square feet), with exceptions
as explained.
One final point learned from interviews is that the real estate service
provider market appears to be bifurcated. There are international agencies and
local agencies. By most accounts, DTZ and Colliers, two international full service
real estate companies, dominate the market. Services provided include
brokerage, property management, evaluations, consulting, and tenant
representation. There are smaller foreign agencies that have both foreigners and
locals on staff. Foreign companies use them as well. However, the local real
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estate service providers do not appear to be competing with the foreign real
estate service providers.
Form of Entry into Ukraine and Real Estate Strategy
Exhibit 5-2 summarizes the forms of entry of the seven service sector
companies interviewed.
Service Sector
Exhibit 5-2
Form of Entry and Real Estate Strategy
for Service Sector Companies
Company Form of Entry # of How has Use of Types of
Number and Sites Real Real Services
Type Estate Estate Used
Been Service
Obtained Providers
1 Service Internal Expansion - Rep. 1 Purchased Yes Broker &
Sector Office for Marketing only Tenant Rep
2 Internal Expansion - Rep. 1 Leased Yes Broker &
Office for Sales, and Tenant Rep
Distribution
3 Internal Expansion - Rep. 2 Leased Yes Broker &
Office for Sales, and Tenant Rep
Distribution
4 Internal Expansion - 1 Leased Yes Broker &
Tenant Rep
5 Internal Expansion - 1 Leased Yes Broker &
Tenant Rep
6 Joint Venture - 50/50 w/ 2 Leased Yes Broker &
Local Company Tenant Rep
7 _ Franchise 25 Leased No N/A
Source:Author
Although six of seven companies are noted above as using real estate
service providers, the use is actually limited. Companies may enlist the help of a
broker but will still continue to search separately and often times find space on
their own. What is most interesting from the data collected is that the interviewed
companies used a number of unique variations on established forms of entry
discussed earlier. And, not surprisingly, all but one leased in the current market.
The seven service sector companies interviewed entered via Internal
Expansions, Joint Ventures, and Franchising. Five companies chose internal
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expansion. Of those five, however, there were unique strategies for entering the
Ukrainian market. One company expanded internally through a representative
office strictly involved in marketing with no sales activity taking place within
Ukraine. Two companies expanded internally into Ukraine and leased
representative offices involved in the sales and distribution process with no direct
sales at their office. Two others expanded internally and are open for business at
their offices. Two enterprises chose different routes into Ukraine. One company
formed a 50/50 joint venture with a local partner. The final service company did
not actually invest directly in Ukraine. Instead the multinational enterprise found
an agent in Ukraine to carry out its business in the form of a franchise. The local
agent carries all the risks attributable to being in Ukraine, and is fully responsible
for the procurement of the necessary real estate involved in carrying out the
business of the franchiser.
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Manufacturing Sector
Exhibit 5-3
Form of Entry and Real Estate Strategy
for Manufacturing Sector Companies
Company Form of Entry # of How has Use of Types of
Number and Sites Real Real Services
Type Estate Estate Used
Been Service
Obtained Providers
8 Manufacturer Joint Venture - 1 Developed Yes Attorney,
Developed a Greenfield Accounting
Project
9 Joint Venture/ License -13 Developed, Yes Construct.
Agreement - with Local Leased, Mngment.,
Privatized Manufacturer and Project
Acquired Mngment.
Through
Joint
Venture
10 JV/Consortium - with 1 Acquired Yes Attorney
State-Owned Company Through
Joint
Venture
11 Internal Expansion- 3 Leased and Yes Broker &
1) entered Ukraine as Acquired Tenant Rep
representative sales through
office originally; buying
2) registered as Ukrainian another
company, 3) acquired company
another company
Source: Author
Of the four manufacturing companies interviewed, three entered Ukraine
by way of joint ventures, but took distinct routes in setting up shop. One company
formed a joint venture, with a privatized company that was completing a
manufacturing plant. At the same time, another company formed a consortium
with a state-owned company, which already had facilities.
The third manufacturer formed a joint venture in the same year as the
previous two manufacturers. A Ukrainian legal entity was formed to develop a
greenfield manufacturing plant. Land was leased from a lessee of the state, and
a multi-use manufacturing facility was constructed. Later, the manufacturer
obtained a perpetual use certificate issued by the local administration which is a
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right to the land that is legally mortgageable and transferable with certain use
restrictions.
The fourth manufacturer entered by way of internal expansion slightly
earlier than the other manufacturers. This enterprise entered, however, as a
representative sales office only. Once the representative office became an official
Ukrainian entity, it purchased a manufacturing business in Ukraine and now
manufactures, imports, exports, and sells products in Ukraine as well.
In comparing the forms of entry and real estate strategies for the
respondents, patterns are visible. A majority of the service sector companies
entered by expanding operations from within as a wholly owned subsidiary, while
the manufacturers entered Ukraine by way of a joint venture in three of four
cases. The service sector companies preferred to lease their space while the
manufacturers acquired their facilities through development, leasing, purchasing,
or acquiring through joint ventures. One final note, no interviewed company, or
company doing business in Ukraine that participated in the OECD survey,
merged with or acquired a Ukrainian firm while still a foreign entity. One of the
interviewees, however, acquired a firm after entering Ukraine and registering as
a Ukrainian entity however. The laws on such matters are inconsistent and this
appears to have adversely affected the merger and acquisitions of Ukrainian
companies.
Space Procurement Decisions
A majority of the respondents were lessees. When asked why they chose
leasing as the means for procuring real estate, the top four responses were cost,
corporate policy, investment/political risk and flexibility. The respondents felt that
it was less expensive to lease versus buy. This appears to be true since
financing is difficult to obtain in Ukraine and is very expensive. It is also common
for corporations to have blanket policies related to leasing versus owning. The
fears related to investment or political risk include 1) committing to a long term
investment when the company position in Ukraine is uncertain, 2) the risks
involved with selling the property when exiting the market, and 3) the ever
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present fear of the communist party returning to power and the potential loss of
property value or the property all together. The last reason why companies
favored leasing was for flexibility. The Ukrainian marketplace is very unstable;
companies are growing at tremendous speeds; but two years ago, with the
Russian financial crisis, most companies were retrenching. Therefore, in a
dynamic market such as Ukraine, flexibility to change with the market is
important.
Real Estate Challenqes in Ukraine
Exhibit 5-4 compares the real estate challenges of the thesis interviewees
with challenges identified through the review of the surveys completed by OECD,
and by the German Advisory Group. The first survey explored challenges
associated with doing business in transitional economies while the second
survey identified challenges of doing business in Ukraine. The challenges from
the surveys are listed above on the left while the challenges noted during the
interviews are listed on the left below the surveys' challenges. Notes
corresponding to the challenges are included on the right. The following chart
summarizes information gathered related to the challenges identified.
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Exhibit 5-4
Real Estate Challenges in Ukraine
Challenges Noted From the Literature Notes on the Challenges
Administrative Infrastructure
· Planning permission takes too long True but takes long in US
too
· Government/legal uncertainty Laws amended often
Inconsistent implementation
· Bureaucratic issues Impossible to identify
person in charge
* Government failure to abide by promise Revoked 5 year tax
exemption for JVs
· Corruption/bribery Payoffs for approvals
* Animosity towards foreign investors Unhelpful, disinterested
Unsatisfactory transport infrastructure Need funding for repairs
Lack of telecommunications infrastructure Progress being made
Budgets and financing
· Difficulties with local banks Financing unavailable
Property rights Mostly leasehold but
laws are changing
Difficulty obtaining real estate Not so much anymore
Challenges Noted During the Interviews
Budgets and financing
* Cost Rents have plummeted
Property Rights Same as above
Parking/Location Limited City Center parking
Telecom Infrastructure Same as above
Sources: Ukraine at The Crossroads 146-157, Author's Interviews
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Challenges Noted From the Literature
Planning permission takes too long - A number of respondents confirmed
that the development process in Ukraine requires over 100 separate approvals.
The timeframe however does not appear to be any longer than in the US. The
challenges are different though.
Government/legal uncertainty - Complaints include uncertainties of
interpretation of laws, postponement of the introduction of laws, inconsistent
legislation, interpretation and application of laws, lack of coordination between
authorities and authorities' inability to interpret the nuances of the laws.'05
'We employ four people who do nothing but collate
and evaluate the latest legislation. The laws are
amended so frequently that the officials themselves
are often not familiar with them." (Multinational
company with branches in over 100 countries)'06
One reason for these legal difficulties of course is the unique situation of
transitioning to a market economy. Another reason however, is the shear bulk of
laws created. For example 26 decrees were issued in 1996, for just the
cosmetics industry. In comparison, Germany has only one law for this industry. 07
One result of the number of laws created is inconsistency among them.
For example, one law noted that foreign entities can fully own existing Ukrainian
companies or newly formed subsidiaries. A later law contradicts this by stating
that in a particular industry such as publishing, a foreign company is limited to
only 30% ownership of enterprises in Ukraine.10
Bureaucratic issues - One French respondent to the OECD survey
commented on his experience in a transitional economy,
"Impossibility to identify the people responsible,
decision makers who change and change their minds.
The prevalent 'lobbyism' - all sorts of influences on
the decision-makers from all directions which have
made the situation even more difficult."09
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Government failure to abide by promise - Companies that registered as
joint ventures by January 1, 1995 were promised tax exemptions for 5 years.
Two years later the exemption was revoked.'1
Corruption/bribery - Jeffrey Sachs, former Director of Harvard's Institute
for International Development has been quoted as stating that anyone interested
in doing business in Ukraine should be prepared to pay up to fifty bribes: for
electricity, land, water, and police protection, etc.111 Much was mentioned in the
literature as well as in the interviews about bribery and government
corruption.1 2' 113 A number of interview respondents suggested bribery and
corruption are common and expected, with one individual suggesting that this
was so commonplace that it could be budgeted for on the balance sheet.
Animosity towards foreiqn investors - The literature was quite negative
about the attitudes of government civil servants. The government does not
appear to convey an understanding or appreciation of the benefits derived from
foreign investment. They certainly do not act as though they are in competition
with all the other transitional economies for a companies business. It appears as
though government authorities intentionally discourage foreign investment. For
example, an export license takes three weeks to obtain in Ukraine, whereas in
other competing countries it takes a couple of hours and no more than a day."14
However, one interviewee suggested quite the opposite. It was suggested
that foreigners coming to Ukraine are very arrogant and that they should try to fit
into the Ukrainian procedural system instead of complain. Another interviewee
noted that they did not have any difficulties with real estate matters, rather, there
was a protocol that needed to be followed.
Unsatisfactory Transport Infrastructure
Roads are there. The problem lies with the construction technology and
equipment needed to improve roads crossing the border from Poland to Lviv, to
the industrial Black Sea region in the south, and to Moscow to the north. 115
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Railways are there as well and connect all the major cities but on a wide gauge
track; thereby creating delays due to switching to the narrower European track.116
Telecommunications infrastructure
Progress is being made on this front. Telecommunications in the former
Soviet Union has always lagged behind western countries. In 1998, Ukraine
ranked second at 18.3 among Commonwealth of Independent States in number
of phone lines per 100 inhabitants with 18.3.119 However, Kyiv's density, of 39.4
per 100 inhabitants approaches the European average.120 A number of joint
ventures have been created to address deficiencies in Ukrainian infrastructure.
Infocom, a Ukrainian-German JV, is developing and maintaining networks, and
providing document telecommunications services. Utel, a Ukrainian, German,
American, Dutch JV, is improving national and international long distance
services. A Ukrainian, Dutch, Danish, and German JV called Ukrainian Mobile
Communications is building, operating and maintaining the wireless network.
Budgets and Financing
There is no competitive financial network in which the best businesses get
the financing. The private sector accounts for less than 2% of the financial
sector's assets, and are owned by enterprises entirely for the use of the parent
enterprise and not for making loans to private-sector borrowers. 121 Investors
need to work with foreign banks since the local banking system is incapable of
providing venture capital. Total available loan capital in the Western Ukraine
region is estimated at no more than $500,000. As the memory of hyperinflation is
still fresh (1993), loans are usually for 3 to 5 months only with interest at 70-
75%. 122 Rates that high are sure to impact investment in real estate.
Property rights - Real Estate Law
One of the biggest disagreements among legislators is over privatization
of land. While some feel that land reform and privatization are the keys to
economic development, others are very resistant to the ideas. And until recently,
only buildings could be owned privately, while urban land underneath the
buildings remained the property of the state. Prior to 1991, foreigners were
forbidden to purchase any type of real estate interest. Private owners of buildings
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were given the right to occupy the underlying land for a nominal fee indefinitely.
Many real estate users are uncomfortable with leasehold interests in land, for the
simple reason that after the end of the lease term, the land, and often times more
importantly, everything improved on the land, reverts to the lessor of the land.
real estate law in the past allowed for ownership of building.
Recent developments have taken place in the area of property rights.
President Kuchma's Decree No. 32/99. "On Sale of Non-Agricultural Land
Parcels," dated January 19, 1999 became effective the following March.'2 3 It
authorizes land with buildings or unfinished construction to be privatized. Land
excluded from privatization includes inter alia agricultural land, land to be used for
personal residences, and reserve and park lands. According to the draft of the
new Land Code, dated 4/21/00, foreign citizens, legal entities, and states can only
own non-arable land.124 As indicated before, numerous laws are being created
and amended on an ongoing basis.
Difficulty Obtaining Real Estate
Acquiring a site in Western Ukraine is no problem due to abundance of
idle and disused state enterprises in the region. However, many investors choose
to rent factory premises, in order to minimize losses incurred from rapid
disinvestment in the event of sudden political or economic collapse. A foreign
factory owner says, "This must never be ruled out in Ukraine. We hope to be
doing business here for more than 10 years from now, but decided to pay
$15,000 per year rent for our premises, although the sale price was only
$120,000. Just now, the risks are too high to commit that sum of money; which
does not take into account the bribes you need to pay here and there to acquire
premises in the first place." Costs in Western Ukraine are below average and
there is no restriction on foreign ownership on a leasehold basis. Good quality
farmland can be obtained for about $3,000 per hectare (2.471 acres), while office
space in Lviv, the region's commercial center, ranges from $3 to $40 per sq
meter ($0.28 to $3.74 per sq. ft.) per month. 125
The situation in Kyiv, where most business takes place is rather different
than the previous example of Western Ukraine. "BC", (before the financial crisis
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in 1998), demand outpaced supply of high quality office space. Real estate was
very difficult to obtain. However, overconstruction coupled with a drop in demand,
due to retrenchment of businesses after the financial crisis, resulted in an
oversupply of space. Space is now more affordable and more readily available.
This is the case with leasing space. Purchasing real estate remains difficult
primarily due to the lack of available financing. As suggested however, by the
previous quote from the factory owner in Western Ukraine, the demand for
purchasing real estate by businesses in Ukraine does not appear to be very high.
Besides financing difficulties, the reason according to real estate service
providers is flexibility. Companies want the ability to expand and contract with the
market. Perhaps more importantly, leasing is the exit strategy used to minimize
exposure to the omnipresence of political risks.
Chapter Synopsis
The real estate challenges are dependent on the form in which real estate
is obtained. An enterprise can develop property, buy facilities, lease space, or
acquire, or joint venture with, a company that already has the necessary facilities.
In acquiring property through a joint venture or an acquisition of a company, the
real estate facilities are included. The facilities likely need to be updated,
however the procurement of the facility is by default. One other suggestion
mentioned during the interviews was to evaluate the seller's right to the property
they are selling. It may be the case that there is no clear title.
Those respondents that had developed property had more complicated
challenges than simply cost that was the big complaint of the lessees. There are
a number of challenges associated with greenfield developments. They entail a
lot more work and preparation than leasing or purchasing a ready to use facility.
One enterprise developed a greenfield site in 1994 after selecting a site. The
investment group worked with the local administration, presented feasibility
studies, and determined the expected use of local infrastructure such as roads
and utilities.
One of the challenges of development mentioned was the difficulty in
obtaining approval of the construction and engineering plans. The reason for this
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was that the foreign consultants used were not familiar with local standards.
Therefore, local engineers and constructors needed to be hired
The more difficult problem which the same developer had was with
dealing with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
which subsidized the venture. Three separate legal opinions were necessary
along with financial and accounting documentation that resulted in soft cost
overruns. Hard costs on the other hand were within budget including numerous
change orders.
A number of interesting points were made during the chapter which will be
summarized here. First, real estate appears to be undermanaged in Ukraine.
Often times the real estate transactions are handled internally due to modest
needs of the small offices typically found in Ukraine, as well as the costs
associated with using a service provider.
The preferred form of entry for the service sector companies was internal
expansion while it was the joint venture for manufacturing companies. The form
of entry for the manufacturers was their preferred form of procuring property,
while the service sector companies preferred to lease property. The four reasons
given for leasing were cost, corporate policy, investment/political risk and
flexibility. Leasing was not only the easiest form of obtaining space, but the best
strategy for such an unstable market.
Exhibit 5-4 shows that the information collected from the interviews is
partly inline with that from the literature reviewed. The German Advisory Group
research showed that legal and government impediments were the greatest
constraints on doing business in Ukraine. The OECD study similarly concluded
that "central bureaucracy and administrative and legal issues" were external
constraints of FDI in transitional economies. The thesis interviews show that
"administrative infrastructure" was high on the list of real estate challenges
mentioned by our respondents.
The one inconsistency was that cost was the biggest real estate challenge
in Ukraine but was not mentioned by the surveys. One explanation could be that
the survey questions were focused on doing business in general while the
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interviews were strictly focused on real estate challenges. Whereas cost is
always an issue in real estate, it typically isn't when discussing impediments to
doing business unless it is in the perspective of financing.
Another point worthy of note, is that prices for similar office space have
dropped over 50% in the last two years in Kyiv. Yet the biggest real estate
challenge suggested by the interviewees was cost. Costs have dropped since the
crisis but operating within budget constraints will always be a challenge.
In comparing the transitional economy information with the thesis interview
a number of similarities were found. First, there are administrative infrastructure
constraints which may slow the speed to market for a potential foreign investor.
Second, the motives for investing according to the surveys showed that market
opportunity was a major influence in investing in the region similar to what was
found in the interviews. Finally, when those two points are looked at together it is
apparent that the joint venture is a logical form of entry into the market which was
what was found in the surveys and in the interviews. Therefore forms of entry can
have real estate implications that should not be overlooked.
Coca Cola Beverages Ukraine
According to a report from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, dated March 2000,
Coca Cola is the leading foreign investor in Ukraine in terms of capital invested
having expended over $200 million since 1994. The following case on Coca-
Cola's experience in Ukraine caps the data analysis chapter by examining the
key real estate-related points made in the chapter including the corporate real
estate decision making process, service provider usage, form of entry into the
country, real estate strategy and finally real estate challenges.
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Decision Making Process
The Coca-Cola Company is the world's leading manufacturer,
marketer, and distributor of nonalcoholic beverage concentrates and syrups.
Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, The Coca-Cola Company's products are
manufactured and sold in nearly 200 countries around the world-. The
Company is registered in all the countries it has a presence in, and is
represented in Ukraine by a representative office, Coca-Cola Ukraine.
An office is rented by its representative office Coca-Cola Ukraine from
its bottling partner in Ukraine Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine at their bottling
plant in Brovary, Ukraine. Coca-Co-la Beverages: Ukraine,: manufactures, sells
and distributes products:of The:Coca-Cola Company in Ukraine.
The Central Europe and Eurasia Group of The Coca-Cola Company,
based in Vienna encompasses 32 countries. They coordinate strategic
direction for:the business for the representative offices :in these countries.
Coca-Cola: Beverages: Ukraine is the-bottling company which has a
licensing agreement to bottle and distribute Coca-Cola in Ukraine. Coca-Cola
Beverages Ukraine manufactures, sells and distributes products of The Coca-
Cola Company in Ukraine and adheres to corporate standards in making real
estate decisions and uses :Coca-Cola Vienna as an advisor.
Form of Entry and Real Estate StrateM:v
Coca-Cola Amatil, a bottling partner of the Coca-Cola Company in
Australia and Asia entered Ukraine as part of its expansion plans into Central
and Eastern Europe. In 1994; Coca-Cola Amatil formed a joint venture in
western Ukraine with Kolos Brewery of Lvivwhich had a: partially completed
soft drinks factory. Together they created Coca-Cola Amatil Ukraine. The
Coca-Cola Company licenses Coca-Cola Amatil Ukraine to bottle and
distribute Coca-Cola products in Ukraine.
A joint venture was the ideal form of entry into the Ukrainian market.
"Lviv was chosen for the site: essentially because Kolos Brewery possessed a
partially completed soft drinks factory that could be adapted to meet Coca-
Cola Amatil's stringent selection criteria and be developed within a tight
timeframe," says company's:public affairs director Barry Blufer. "Lviv offers
highly qualified and enthusiastic workers. Local government is interested in
attracting new investment to combat unemployment and it is willing to assist in
the fast track processing of development applications for worthwhile projects."
Since completing its factory in 1995, Coca-Cola has moved from partial to full
ownership and has continued to expand production. Coca-Cola Amatil
divested itself from it's central and eastern European operations. A new
company, Coca-Cola Beverages, Ltd.: was created. Coca-Cola Bevarges
recently merged with Hellenic Bottling Company to create Coca-Cola Hellenic
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Bottling Company.
From its Lviv bottling plant, Coca-Cola Amatil manufactured soft
drinks for distribution and sale throughout Ukraine. In 1998 an additional
factory:and office complex was constructed in Brovary 50 kilometers from
Kiev. Since that time manufacturing has ceased at Lviv due to the downturn
in the market. Lviv is being used as a warehouse. There are 7-10 distribution
branches consisting of warehouses throughout the country which are leased.
Most regional warehouses are leased and have been outfitted to
Coca-Cola's specifications. The bottling plant in Brovary was a greenfield
investment and includes all of Coca Cola's office space in Kyiv. The Brovary
complex is owned with a 49 year ground lease. The Lviv bottling plant was
obtained through the original joint venture when Coca-Cola entered Ukraine.
It is presently being used as a distribution facility.
Service Provider Usage 
Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine has used various real estate service providers
over the years for services such as brokerage, tenant representation,
construction management and project management
Corporate Real Estate Challenes in Ukraine
Initially after independence, Ukraine was a new frontier. According to Sonya
Soutus, Coca-Cola Communications Director for the company's Central
Europe and Eurasia Group. 'The government wanted foreign investment but
the Former Soviet Union was acking in an-administrative infrastructure to
accommodate al: the needs of foreign investors. This was created. There
was: no tradition of rent agreements with foreign entities. This was very new:
and administrative routines had to be developed."
'Things improved - renting office space was made easier, leasing has
become a lot easier - a process has been developed for notarizing contracts.
The people have been wonderful, it's just the structure that has been at times
difficult. The people: areadaptable -while the system can be cumbersome."
The Coca-Cola case provides significant insights into the corporate real
estate experience in Ukraine. Coca-Cola may be one of the most intense users
of real estate of U.S. companies in Ukraine. It owns as well as leases properties.
Its warehouses are typically rehabilitated whether they are leased or not. Coca-
Cola entered the country through a joint venture which provided Coca-Cola both
entry to the country as well as manufacturing facilities. As a manufacturing
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company, the use of a joint venture for entering a country is consistent with
literature reviewed about transitional economies and about Ukraine.
Their primary reason for entering Ukraine was market opportunity. This is
also consistent with the literature reviewed. The administrative challenges they
have faced are similarly consistent with the results of the interviews and surveys.
Finally, Coca-Cola is an example of an enterprise that requires significant real
estate services. However, similar to industry-wide trends in international real
estate, they still are making decisions locally, but with the help of a variety of real
estate service providers.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Real estate may have once been an undermanaged resource, but it is
now a resource in transition. In the U.S., corporate real estate units are making
the transition from traditional service providers to strategic planners. That may be
so in corporate America, but in Ukraine, most decisions are made locally,
typically by someone whose primary job is in another area of expertise. Any real
estate services that are needed are transactional in nature, not strategic. Yet,
although there is a lack of expertise locally, the companies interviewed appear to
be succeeding with the most important objectives of corporate real estate. First,
by leasing property in Ukraine, companies are buffering themselves from
uncertainties. Second, the real estate executives remain focused on costs. When
this research began, the feeling was that there would be an important role for
service providers in a decentralized environment. However, it appears as though
the internal staff is managing on its own with occasional support from
decentralized regional headquarters, and has relegated external service
providers to a secondary role. This research focused on accumulating data in
Ukraine, at the business unit level. To continue this area of research, it would be
interesting to go back to the CRE staffs at corporate headquarters and research
their side of the international corporate real estate management story.
Ukraine offers market, supply, and political reasons for direct investment.
First, there is market opportunity. Next, there is low labor costs. Finally the import
barriers further incentivize direct investment in the country. According to the
thesis research, from surveys and the interviews, the favorite forms of entry into
Ukraine are joint ventures and internal expansion. The service sector companies
interviewed preferred internal expansion, while the manufacturing companies
searched out joint venture partners that already had facilities. Ukrainian law does
not encourage the acquisition of Ukrainian companies by foreign entities
explaining the lack of mergers and acquisitions to this point. It might be
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interesting to further research the relationship between forms of entry into foreign
countries and corporate real estate.
Much of the literature that was reviewed mentioned examples or studies
that took place a number of years ago, certainly prior to the financial crisis in
1998. Significant changes have taken place over the nine-year period since
independence. The most apparent change is that there is a glut of office space in
Kyiv, after the overbuilding and the retrenchment following the financial crisis.
As a former centrally planned and centrally owned country, the
government used to own most everything. This is slowly changing through
privatization which will offer the opportunity to acquire state owned companies
and property. The real estate implications of privatization in a formerly centrally
planned economy from a corporate standpoint would also be interesting
research.
A lot of interest has been shown in Ukraine during the last nine years. The
initial enthusiasm after Ukraine's independence has been replaced with a greater
awareness of the challenges of doing business in Ukraine. The challenges found
in Ukraine, are consistent with those found in other transitional economies.
Although complex, the challenges found in Ukraine do not preclude participation
in the market; rather they merely impede the process.
65
Endnotes
1 Michael Joroff, Marc Louargand, Sandra Lambert, and Franklin Becker,
Strategic Management of the Fifth Resource: Corporate Real Estate, (Norcross,
Georgia: Industrial Development Research Foundation, 1993) 11.
2 Mike E Miles, Gayle Berens, and Marc A. Weiss, Real Estate
Development:Principles and Process, (Washington, D.C.:Urban Land Institute,
2000) 476.
3 Martha A. O'Mara, Strategy and Place: Managing Corporate Real Estate
and Facilities for Competitive Advantage, (New York: Free Press, 1999) 3.
4 O'Mara, 3.
5 O'Mara, 5.
6 Sandra Lambert, Jean Poteete, and Alison Waltch, "Generating High-
Performance Corporate Real Estate Service ", (Norcross. Georgia: International
Development Research Council, 1995) 4.
Lambert, Generating 5.
8 Lambert, Generating 6.
9 Lambert, Generating 6.
10 Lambert, Generating 6.
11 Lambert, Generating 6.
12 Lambert, Generating 6.
13 Lambert, Generating 6.
14 Sandra Lambert and Jean Poteete, Managing Global Real
Estate,.(Norcross. Georgia: International Development Research Council,
1998)70-4.
15 Lambert, Managing 70-4.
16 Lambert, Managing 71.
17 Wolfgang Schaefers, "Corporate Real Estate Management: Evidence
from German Companies" Journal of Real Estate Research 17:3 1999, 301-20.
18 Peter Read Veale, Corporate Real Estate Asset Management in the
United States, Master's Thesis (Cambridge:MIT, 1988) 121.
19 O'Mara, 20.
20 O'Mara, 5.
21 Lambert, Managing 30-1.
22Kent Miller, "A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in
International Business," Journal of International Business Studies Second
Quarter 1992, 311-2.
23 Lambert, Managing 64.
24 Lambert, Managing 64.
25 Lambert, Managing 64.
26 Lambert, Managing 64.
27 Lambert, Managing 76-7.
28 Lambert, Managing 91-2.
29 The World Bank Group, 1999/2000 World Development Report.
accessed 13 July 2000 http://wbln001 8.worldbank. orj/iECAleca. nsf/.
30 World Bank Group.
66
31 World Bank Group.
32 World Bank Group.
33 Carl A. Nelson, "International Business: A Manager's Guide to Strategy
in the age of Globalism", (London: International Thomson Business Press, 1999)
12.
34 Charles J. Fombrum and Stefan Wally, "Global Entanglements: The
Structure of Corporate Transnationalism," in Globalizing Management: Creating
and Leading the Competitive Organization, eds. Vladimir Pucik, et al (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1992) 24.
35 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy,
(Wokingham, Eng: Addison -Wesley, 1992) 5.
36Fombrum, 24.
37 Ricky W. Griffin and Michael W. Pustay, International Business: A
Mana-gerial Perspective 2d ed. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1999) 26-30.
3Griffin, 108-113.
39 Griffin, 419-20.
40 Griffin, 86-94.
41 Griffin, 94.
42 Griffin, 95-6.
43 Griffin, 98-101.
44 Klaus Schwab, Michael E. Porter, Jeffrey D. Sachs, et al., The Global
Competitiveness Report 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 31.
45 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations: With a New
Introduction, (Houndsmills, Eng: Macmillan Press, 1998) 71-130.
46 Griffin, 419-20.
47 John H. Dunning, The Globalization of Business, (NewYork: Routledge,
1993) 208-9.
48 Dunning, Globalization 292.
49 Franklin R. Root, Entry Strategies for International Markets, (New York:
Lexington Books, 1994) 137.
50 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy,
(Wokingham, Eng: Addison -Wesley, 1992) 5.
.Dunning, Globalization 299.
52 Dunning, Globalization 294.
53 Please note that it is incorrect to assume that all cross-border M&A is
FDI. FDI is the sum of equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company
loans invested in a foreign country. Since M&A is often financed outside the host
country, the equity capital portion of the M&A may be much less than the
reported value of the merger or acquisition. Also the equity capital investment
can be spread out over years.
54 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Report 1999: Foreian Direct Investment and the Challenge of
Development, (New York: United Nations, 1999) 4,8,95,465-76.
Dunning, Globalization 292.
56 Dunning, Globalization 292-3.
57 Griffin, 106.
67
58Griffin, 107.
59Griffin, 106.
0 Griffin, 107.
61 Dunning, Globalization, 81-3.
62 Dunning, Globalization, 81-3.
63 Dunning, Multinational, 59.
64 The eight indicators of competitiveness are evaluated qualitatively as
well as quantitatively by using over 170 subvariables.
65 The equation is: Gi= a + b*Ci - c*Yi,where Gi is the annual average
growth of country "I", Ci is the competitive index and Yi is the log of per capita
income of the country in 1992. "Yi" is used to take into consideration the
generally accepted principle that poorer countries tend to grow faster than richer
countries assuming similar levels of competitiveness.
66 Schwab, Porter, and Sachs, 96-8.
67 The eight indicators of competitiveness are evaluated qualitatively as
well as quantitatively by using over 170 subvariables.
68 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Patterns
and Determinants of Economic Reform in Transition Economies: 1990-1998
7/8/00 www.dec.orq/pdf docs/pnach818.pdf.
69USAID, Benchmarking Competitiveness In Transition Economies
accessed 7/8/00 www.dec.org/pdf docs/pnach819.pdf
70 USAID, The Gains from Privatization in Transition Economies: Is
"Change of Ownership" Enough? accessed
7/8/00www. dec. org/pdf docs/pnach820. pdf
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1998 Civil Society, Democracy and
Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States accessed
7/19/00 www.freedomhouse.orq/nit98/.
72 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Assessing
Investment Opportunities in Economies in Transition, (Paris: OECD, 1994) 9.
73 OECD, 9,20.
74 OECD, 11.
75 OECD, 37.
76 OECD, 37.
77 OECD, 37.
78 OECD, 36-9, 55.
79 OECD, 39.
80 OECD, 45.
81 OECD, 55.
82 Please note multiple responses from some respondents.
3 OECD, 10,29-32,124.
84 Dunning, Globalization, 235.
85 Dunning, Globalization, 222.
86 Dunning, Globalization, 226.
87 Dunning, Globalization, 227.
88 Dunning, Globalization, 227.
68
89 Embassy of Ukraine in Canada, Doing Business in Ukraine: Guide for
Foreign Investors accessed 6/26/00
http://www.cyberus. ca/-ukremb/busquide. shtml .
90 Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, Country Reports accessed 7/26/00
(Walden Publishing: updated 6/14/99) Search Term: Ukraine, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/docum... 25.
91 Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, Country Reports 25.
92 Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, Country Reports 25.
93 Freedom House, Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties
accessed 7/19/00
www.freedomhouse.org/survey/2000/reports/countr/ukraine. html.
94 Jules Stewart, "Land of Western Promise" Corporate Location Nov/Dec
1996 46-7, <http://gateway.ovid.com/rel410>
95 Raphael Shen, Ukraine's Economic Reform: Obstacles, Errors,
Lessons, (Westport:Praeger 1996) 114-7.
96 OECD, 11,37.
97 Felicitas Mollers, "Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine - Experiences
Taken from Reality", Ukraine at the Crossroads, eds. Axel Siedenberg and Lutz
Hoffman (New York: Physica-Verlag, 1999) 142..
98 Mollers 147.
99 Please note there are two common spelling versions for the capital city
of Ukraine - Kyiv and Kyiv.
lOO UNCTAD, 434.
101 The new construction has resulted in an increase in the level of quality
of office space for example, modern elevators, heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC), electrical systems, floorplates, and management.
102 Sergey Sergiyenko, personal interview, 8/7100.
103 University of Denver School of Real Estate and Construction
Management, The Global Real Estate Project accessed 7/19/00
http://director.dcb.du.edu/recm/trends2.asp.
104 Terry Pickard, "Property Costs," The Ukrainian Issue II, 2000.
105 Mollers, Foreign, 150-1.
106 Mollers, Foreign, 150.
107 Mollers, Foreign, 151.
108 Mollers, Foreign, 151.
109OECD, 37.
110 Mollers, Foreign, 152.
111 Volodymyr Zviglyanich, "Ukraine's economic crisis:is there light at the
end of the tunnel?", PRISM, 1/23/98 4:2 <www.jamestown.org.pubs>
112 Schwab, Porter, and Sachs.
113 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1998.
114 Mollers, Foreign, 155.
115 Stewart, Land 46-7.
116 Stewart, Land 46-7.
117 Schwab, Porter, and Sachs.
118 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1998.
69
119 Nadine Kettaneh, 'Telecommunications", Doing Business in Ukraine,
eds. Adam Jolly and Nadine Kettaneh, (London:Kogan, 1998) 96-9.
120 Kettaneh 96-9.
121 Shen 165-83.
122 Stewart 46-7.
123 Ankel.
124 Dow Jones Interactive, Cabinet Approves Draft Law on Land
Ownership as reported in Eastern Economist Daily, 4/24/00.
Stewart 46-7.
70
Bibliography
Dow Jones Interactive. Cabinet Approves Draft Law on Land Ownership, as
reported in Eastern Economist Daily, 4/24/00.
Dunning, John H. The Globalization of Business. NewYork: Routledge, 1993.
Dunning, John H. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy.
Wokingham, Eng: Addison -Wesley, 1992.
Embassy of Ukraine in Canada. Doing Business in Ukraine: Guide for Foreign
Investors accessed 6/26/00
http://www. cyberus.ca/-ukremb/busguide. shtm I.
Fombrum ,Charles J. and Wally, Stefan. "Global Entanglements: The Structure of
Corporate Transnationalism", Globalizing Management: Creating and
Leading the Competitive Organization. eds. Vladimir Pucik, et al. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
Freedom House. Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties. accessed
7/19/00.
www.freedomhouse. org/survey/2000/reports/country/ukraine. html.
Freedom House. Nations in Transit 1998 Civil Society, Democracy and Markets
in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States. accessed
7/19/00. www.freedomhouse.org/nit98/.
Griffin, Ricky W. and Pustay, Michael. International Business: A Managerial
Perspective, 2d ed. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1999.
Joroff, Michael, Louargand, Marc, Lambert, Sandra, and Becker, Franklin.
Strategic Management of the Fifth Resource: Corporate Real Estate.
Norcross, Georgia: Industrial Development Research Foundation, 1993.
Kettaneh, Nadine. 'Telecommunications", Doing Business in Ukraine, eds. Adam
Jolly and Nadine Kettaneh. London:Kogan, 1998.
Lambert, Sandra, Poteete, Jean, and Waltch, Alison. Generating High-
Performance Corporate Real Estate Service. Norcross, Georgia:
International Development Research Council, 1995.
Lambert, Sandra and Poteete,Jean. Managing Global Real Estate. .Norcross,
Georgia: International Development Research Council, 1998.
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Country Reports accessed 7/26/00 (Walden
Publishing: updated 6/14/99) Search Term: Ukraine, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/docum ....
Miles, Mike E., Berens, Gayle, and Weiss, Marc A. Real Estate
Development:Principles and Process. Washington, D.C. Urban Land
Institute, 2000.
Miller, Kent. "A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International
Business," Journal of International Business Studies. Second Quarter
1992, 311-2.
Mollers, Felicitas. "Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine - Experiences Taken
from Reality" Ukraine at the Crossroads, eds. Axel Siedenberg and Lutz
Hoffman. New York: Physica-Verlag, 1999.
71
Nelson, Carl A. International Business: A Manager's Guide to Strategy in the age
of Globalism. London: International Thomson Business Press, 1999.
O'Mara, Martha A. Strategy and Place: Managing Corporate Real Estate and
Facilities for Competitive Advantage. New York: Free Press, 1999.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Assessing
Investment Opportunities in Economies in Transition. Paris: OECD, 1994.
Pickard, Terry. Property Costs. The Ukrainian Issue 11, 2000.
Porter, Michael E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations: With a New
Introduction. (Houndsmills, Eng: Macmillan Press, 1998.
Root, Franklin R. Entry Strategies for International Markets. New York: Lexington
Books, 1994.
Schaefers, Wolfgang. "Corporate Real Estate Management: Evidence from
German Companies" Journal of Real Estate Research. 17:3 1999, 301-20.
Schwab, Klaus, Porter, Michael E., Sachs, Jeffrey D., et al. The Global
Competitiveness Report 1999. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Shen, Raphael. Ukraine's Economic Reform: Obstacles, Errors, Lessons.
Westport:Praeger 1996.
Stewart, Jules. "Land of Western Promise" Corporate Location Nov/Dec 1996
<http://gateway.ovid.com/rel41 0>
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). World
Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of
Development. New York: United Nations, 1999.
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Benchmarking
Competitiveness In Transition Economies .accessed 7/8/00.
www.dec.orq/pdf docs/pnach81 9.pdf.
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Gains from
Privatization in Transition Economies: Is "Change of Ownership" Enough?.
accessed 7/8/00. www.dec.org/pdf docs/pnach820.pdf.
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Patterns and
Determinants of Economic Reform in Transition Economies: 1990-1998.
accessed 7/8/00. www.dec.org/pdf docs/pnach818.pdf.
University of Denver School of Real Estate and Construction Management. The
Global Real Estate Proiect.accessed 7/19/00.
http://director.dcb.du.edu/recm/trends2.asp.
Veale, Peter Read. Corporate Real Estate Asset Management in the United
States. Master's Thesis Cambridge:MIT, 1988.
The World Bank Group. 1999/2000 World Development Report. accessed 13
July 2000. http://wbIn001 8.worldbank.org/ECA/eca.nsf/.
Zviglyanich, Volodymyr "Ukraine's economic crisis:is there light at the end of the
tunnel?" PRISM. 1/23/98 4:2. wwvw. iamestown.org.pubs.
72
